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Science Of Mind

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1 Mind

   1) To Know the Different Operations of the Mind

   It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reﬂection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reﬂection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)

   2) The Mind Is Furnished by Experience

   Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)

   3) Mythical Thought Is as Rigorous as That of Modern Science

   The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)

   4) The Mind Has Nothing But Itself to Know Itself

   MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)

   5) To Know Is to Represent Accurately

   [Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)

   6) The Question of Mind in Relation to Machine

   Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)

   7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive Analyses

   Recent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have ﬂourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....

   Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.

   In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.

   The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)

   8) Approaches to the Study of the Mind

   Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.

... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind
2 mind

1. noun
1) (remembrance)

bear or keep something in mind — an etwas (Akk.) denken; etwas nicht vergessen

have in mind to do something — vorhaben, etwas zu tun

bring something to mind — etwas in Erinnerung rufen

something comes into somebody's mind — jemandem fällt etwas ein

it went out of my mind — ich habe es vergessen; es ist mir entfallen

put something/somebody out of one's mind — etwas/jemanden aus seinem Gedächtnis streichen

2) (opinion)

give somebody a piece of one's mind — jemandem gründlich die Meinung sagen

in or to my mind — meiner Meinung od. Ansicht nach

be of one or of the same mind, be in one mind — einer Meinung sein

be in two minds about something — [sich (Dat.)] unschlüssig über etwas (Akk.) sein

change one's mind — seine Meinung ändern

have a mind of one's own — seinen eigenen Kopf haben

I have a good mind/half a mind to do that — ich hätte große Lust/nicht übel Lust, das zu tun

make up one's mind, make one's mind up — sich entscheiden

make up one's mind to do something — sich entschließen, etwas zu tun

read somebody's mind — jemandes Gedanken lesen

3) (direction of thoughts)

his mind is on other things — er ist mit den Gedanken woanders

give or put or turn one's mind to — sich konzentrieren auf (+ Akk.) [Arbeit, Aufgabe, Angelegenheit]

I have had somebody/something on my mind — jemand/etwas hat mich beschäftigt; (worried) ich habe mir Sorgen wegen jemandem/etwas gemacht

she has a lot of things on her mind — sie hat viele Sorgen

something preys or weighs on somebody's mind — etwas macht jemandem zu schaffen

take somebody's mind off something — jemanden von etwas ablenken

keep one's mind on something — sich auf etwas (Akk.) konzentrieren

close one's mind to something — sich einer Sache (Dat.) verschließen (geh.)

4) (way of thinking and feeling) Denkweise, die

frame of mind — [seelische] Verfassung

state of mind — [Geistes]zustand, der

be in a frame of mind to do something — in der Verfassung sein, etwas zu tun

have a logical mind — logisch denken

5) (seat of consciousness, thought, volition) Geist, der

it's all in the mind — es ist alles nur Einstellung

in one's mind — im stillen

in my mind's eye — vor meinem geistigen Auge; im Geiste

nothing could be further from my mind than... — nichts läge mir ferner, als...

6) (intellectual powers) Verstand, der; Intellekt, der

have a very good mind — einen klaren od. scharfen Verstand haben

great minds think alike — (joc.) große Geister denken [eben] gleich

7) (normal mental faculties) Verstand, der

lose or go out of one's mind — den Verstand verlieren

be out of one's mind — den Verstand verloren haben

in one's right mind — bei klarem Verstand
2. transitive verb
1) (heed)

don't mind what he says — gib nichts auf sein Gerede

mind what I say — glaub mir

let's do it, and never mind the expense — machen wir es doch, egal, was es kostet

2) (concern oneself about)

he minds a lot what people think of him — es ist für ihn sehr wichtig, was die Leute von ihm denken

I can't afford a bicycle, never mind a car — ich kann mir kein Fahrrad leisten, geschweige denn ein Auto

never mind him/that — (don't be anxious) er/das kann dir doch egal sein (ugs.)

never mind how/where... — es tut nichts zur Sache, wie/wo...

don't mind me — nimm keine Rücksicht auf mich; (don't let my presence disturb you) lass dich [durch mich] nicht stören; (iron.) nimm bloß keine Rücksicht auf mich

mind the doors! — Vorsicht an den Türen!

mind one's P's and Q's — sich anständig benehmen

3) usu. neg. or interrog. (object to)

did he mind being woken up? — hat es ihm was ausgemacht, aufgeweckt zu werden?

would you mind opening the door? — würdest du bitte die Tür öffnen?

do you mind my smoking? — stört es Sie od. haben Sie etwas dagegen, wenn ich rauche?

I wouldn't mind a walk — ich hätte nichts gegen einen Spaziergang

4) (remember and take care)

mind you don't leave anything behind — denk daran, nichts liegen lassen!

mind how you go! — pass auf! sei vorsichtig!; (as general farewell) mach's gut! (ugs.)

mind you get this work done — sieh zu, dass du mit dieser Arbeit fertig wirst!

5) (have charge of) aufpassen auf (+ Akk.)

mind the shop or (Amer.) the store — (fig.) sich um den Laden kümmern (ugs.)
3. intransitive verb
1)

mind! — Vorsicht!; Achtung!

2) usu. in imper. (take note)

follow the signposts, mind, or... — denk daran und halte dich an die Wegweiser, sonst...

I didn't know that, mind, or... — das habe ich allerdings nicht gewusst, sonst...

3) (care, object)

do you mind? — (may I?) hätten Sie etwas dagegen?; (please do not) ich muss doch sehr bitten

he doesn't mind about your using the car — er hat nichts dagegen, wenn Sie den Wagen benutzen

if you don't mind — wenn es dir recht ist

4) (give heed)

never [you] mind — (it's not important) macht nichts; ist nicht schlimm; (it's none of your business) sei nicht so neugierig

never mind: I can do it — schon gut - das kann ich machen

never mind about that now! — lass das jetzt mal [sein/liegen]!

never mind about him - what happened to her? — er interessiert mich nicht - was ist ihr passiert?

Phrasal Verbs:

- academic.ru/89159/mind_out">mind out

* * *
1.
(the power by which one thinks etc; the intelligence or understanding: The child already has the mind of an adult.) der Verstand
2. verb
1) (to look after or supervise (eg a child): mind the baby.) aufpassen

2) (to be upset by; to object to: You must try not to mind when he criticizes your work.) sich etwas machen aus

3) (to be careful of: Mind (= be careful not to trip over) the step!) sich in Acht nehmen

4) (to pay attention to or obey: You should mind your parents' words/advice.) beachten
3. interjection
(be careful!: Mind! There's a car coming!) Achtung!

- -minded
- mindful
- mindless
- mindlessly
- mindlessness
- mindreader
- at/in the back of one's mind
- change one's mind
- be out of one's mind
- do you mind! - have a good mind to
- have half a mind to
- have a mind to
- in one's mind's eye
- in one's right mind
- keep one's mind on
- know one's own mind
- make up one's mind
- mind one's own business
- never mind
- on one's mind
- put someone in mind of
- put in mind of
- speak one's mind
- take/keep one's mind off
- to my mind
* * *

mind

[maɪnd]

I. n

1. (brain, intellect) Geist m, Verstand m

she's one of the greatest \minds of today sie ist einer der größten Köpfe unserer Zeit

it's a question of \mind over matter das ist eine reine Willensfrage

he's got the \mind of a four-year-old! er hat den Verstand eines Vierjährigen!

it was a triumph of \mind over matter hier war der Wille stärker

in one's \mind eyes vor seinem geistigen Auge

frame of \mind seelische Verfassung

a fine \mind ein großer Geist

to have a good \mind einen klaren Verstand haben

to have a logical \mind logisch denken können

to the Victorian \mind nach der viktorianischen Denkweise

to use one's \mind seinen Verstand gebrauchen

2. (sanity) Verstand m

to be in one's right \mind noch ganz richtig im Kopf sein

to be out of one's \mind den Verstand verloren haben

to drive sb out of his/her \mind jdn wahnsinnig machen

to lose [or go out of] one's \mind den Verstand verlieren

3. (thoughts) Gedanken pl

the idea never entered my \mind auf diesen Gedanken wäre ich gar nicht gekommen

it went out of my \mind ich hab's vergessen

you put that out of your \mind! das kannst du dir aus dem Kopf schlagen!

I can't get that song out of my \mind das Lied will mir einfach nicht mehr aus dem Kopf gehen!

sorry, my \mind is on other things tut mir leid, ich bin mit den Gedanken ganz woanders

to be on one's \mind einen beschäftigen

you're always on my \mind ich denke die ganze Zeit an dich

what's on your \mind? woran denkst du?

what's on your \mind! woran du nur wieder denkst!

to be in the back of sb's \mind in jds Hinterkopf sein

to bear [or keep] sth in \mind etw nicht vergessen

bearing in \mind that... angesichts der Tatsache, dass...

to bring [or call] sth to \mind (remember) sich akk etw in Erinnerung rufen; (remind) an etw akk erinnern

to come [or spring] to sb's \mind jdm einfallen

to have sb/sth in \mind an jdn/etw denken

did you have anything special in \mind? dachten Sie an etwas Bestimmtes?

to have a lot of things on one's \mind viele Sorgen haben

to keep one's \mind on sth one's work sich akk auf etw akk konzentrieren

sth puts sb in \mind of sth esp BRIT etw erinnert jdn an etw akk

to put sb out of one's \mind jdn aus seinem Gedächtnis streichen

to read sb's \mind jds Gedanken lesen

to set one's \mind to do sth sich akk auf etw akk konzentrieren

to take sb's \mind off sth jdn auf andere Gedanken bringen [o von etw dat ablenken

4. (intention)

nothing could be further from my \mind than... nichts läge mir ferner als...

to have in \mind to do sth vorhaben, etw zu tun

to know one's [own] \mind wissen, was man will

to make up one's \mind sich akk entscheiden

my \mind is made up! ich habe einen Entschluss gefasst!

to set one's \mind on sth sich dat etw in den Kopf setzen

5. usu sing (opinion) Meinung f, Ansicht f

to my \mind... meiner Meinung nach...

to give sb a piece of one's \mind jdm seine Meinung sagen

to be of the same \mind der gleichen Meinung [o derselben Ansicht] sein

I'm of the same \mind as you ich bin deiner Meinung

to be in [or of] two \minds about sth sich dat über etw akk nicht im Klaren sein

to change one's \mind es sich dat anders überlegen

to have a \mind of one's own seinen eigenen Kopf haben

6. (inclination)

to have half a [good] \mind to... gute Lust haben,...

to be of a \mind to do sth ( form) geneigt sein, etw zu tun

7.

▶ to be bored out of one's \mind sich akk zu Tode langweilen

▶ great \minds think alike ah, ich sehe, wir verstehen uns!

II. vt

1. (be careful of)

▪ to \mind sth auf etw akk aufpassen

\mind your head [or that you don't bang your head] pass auf, dass du dir nicht den Kopf stößt

\mind your head Vorsicht mit dem Kopf!

here, \mind, he said when she trod on his foot passen Sie doch auf, sagte er, als sie ihm auf den Fuß trat

\mind the step! Vorsicht Stufe!

\mind how you go pass doch auf!; (as farewell) pass auf dich auf!

\mind your language! ( dated) pass auf, was du sagst!

2. (care about)

▪ to \mind sb sich akk um jdn kümmern

don't \mind me kümmer dich nicht um mich

don't \mind what she says kümmer dich nicht darum, was sie sagt

and never \mind the expense und vergiss jetzt einfach mal die Kosten

never \mind them — what about me? was kümmern mich die — was ist mit mir?

never \mind her! vergiss sie doch einfach!

never \mind how you got there... ist doch egal, wie du da hinkamst,...

\mind your own business! kümmer dich um deine eigenen Angelegenheiten!

I don't \mind the heat die Hitze macht mir nichts aus!

I don't \mind what she does es ist mir egal, was sie macht!

3. (make certain)

▪ to \mind that... denk daran, dass...

\mind you close the door when you leave vergiss nicht, die Tür zuzumachen, wenn du gehst

\mind you get this done before she gets home sieh zu, dass du damit fertig wirst, bevor sie nach Hause kommt

4. (look after)

▪ to \mind sb/sth auf jdn/etw aufpassen; ( fig)

I'm \minding the shop ich kümmere mich hier um den Laden

5. ( fam: object)

▪ to not \mind sth nichts gegen etw akk [einzuwenden] haben

would you \mind holding this for me? würden Sie das [kurz] für mich halten?

do you \mind my asking you a question? darf ich Ihnen eine Frage stellen?

do you \mind calling me a taxi? würde es dir was ausmachen, mir ein Taxi zu rufen?

do you \mind my smoking? stört es Sie, wenn ich rauche?

I don't \mind her ich habe nichts gegen sie

I wouldn't \mind a new car/a cup of tea gegen ein neues Auto/eine Tasse Tee hätte ich nichts einzuwenden!

6.

▶ to \mind one's p's and q's sich akk gut benehmen

▶ \mind you allerdings

\mind you, I'd love to have a cup of tea! also, gegen eine Tasse Tee hätte ich jetzt nichts einzuwenden!

\mind you, she did try immerhin hat sie es versucht!

III. vi

1. (care) sich dat etwas daraus machen

I don't \mind das ist mir egal

sometime I wish he \minded a little more manchmal wünsche ich mir, dass es ihm ein bisschen mehr ausmachen würde

never \mind! [ist doch] egal!

never \mind, I'll do it myself! vergiss es, ich mach's selbst!

never \mind, one day... mach dir nichts draus — eines Tages...

never \mind about that mistake vergiss den Fehler einfach!

never \mind about that now vergiss das jetzt mal

never \mind about her — what about you? jetzt vergiss sie doch mal — was ist mit dir?

never you \mind! jetzt kümmer dich mal nicht drum!

2. (object) etwas dagegen haben

do you \mind if I...? stört es Sie, wenn ich...?

do you \mind! (don't!) ich muss doch sehr bitten!; (may I?) darf ich?

nobody will \mind das wird niemanden stören

if you don't \mind... wenn du nichts dagegen hast,...

if you don't \mind me saying so,... ich hoffe, es macht dir nichts aus, dass ich dir das jetzt sage, aber...

I don't \mind if I do ich hätte nichts dagegen

3.

▶ never \mind... geschweige denn...

* * *
[maɪnd]
1. NOUN

1) = intellect Geist m (ALSO PHILOS), Verstand m

things of the mind — Geistiges nt

the conscious and unconscious mind — das Bewusste und das Unbewusste

to have a good mind —

one of the finest minds of our times — einer der großen Geister unserer Zeit

it's all in the mind —

in one's mind's eye — vor seinem geistigen Auge, im Geiste

to blow sb's mind (inf) — jdn umwerfen (inf); (drugs) jdn high machen (inf) → boggle, great, improve

it's a question of mind over matter — es ist eine Willenssache or -frage

a triumph of mind over matter — ein Triumph des Geistes or Willens über den Körper

2) = way of thinking Denkweise f; (= type of mind) Geist m, Kopf m

to the child's/Victorian mind — in der Denkweise des Kindes/der viktorianischen Zeit

he has that kind of mind — er ist so veranlagt

to have a literary/logical etc mind — literarisch/logisch etc veranlagt sein

he has the mind of a five-year old — er verhält sich wie ein Fünfjähriger

in the public mind prostitution is immoral — nach dem Empfinden der Öffentlichkeit ist Prostitution unmoralisch

state or frame of mind — (seelische) Verfassung, (Geistes)zustand m

3) = thoughts Gedanken pl

to be clear in one's mind about sth — sich (dat) über etw im Klaren sein

if you put or set your mind to it — wenn du dich anstrengst

he had something on his mind — ihn beschäftigte etwas

I've a lot on my mind — ich muss mich um (so) viele Dinge kümmern

you are always on my mind — ich denke ständig an dich

keep your mind on the job — bleib mit den Gedanken or dem Kopf bei der Arbeit

she couldn't get or put the song/him out of her mind —

you can put that idea out of your mind! — den Gedanken kannst du dir aus dem Kopf schlagen!

to take sb's mind off things — jdn auf andere Gedanken bringen

to take sb's mind off sth — jdn etw vergessen lassen

my mind isn't on my work — ich kann mich nicht auf meine Arbeit konzentrieren

don't let your mind dwell on the problem — grüble nicht über dieses Problem nach

he can't keep his mind off sex — er denkt nur an Sex or an nichts anderes als Sex

the idea never entered my mind — daran hatte ich überhaupt nicht gedacht

it's been going through my mind — es ging mir im Kopf herum

nothing was further from my mind — nichts lag mir ferner

his mind is set on that — er hat sich (dat) das in den Kopf gesetzt

he guessed what was in my mind — er erriet meine Gedanken

in my mind's eye — vor meinem inneren Auge

4) = memory Gedächtnis nt

it went right out of my mind — daran habe ich überhaupt nicht mehr gedacht

that quite put it out of my mind — dadurch habe ich es vergessen

to bring or call sth to mind — etw in Erinnerung rufen, an etw (acc) erinnern

5) = inclination Lust f; (= intention) Sinn m, Absicht f

I've half a mind/a good mind to... —

to be of a mind to do sth — geneigt sein, etw zu tun (geh)

6) = opinion Meinung f, Ansicht f

to change one's mind — seine Meinung ändern (about über +acc ), es sich (dat) anders überlegen

to be in two minds about sth — sich (dat) über etw (acc) nicht im Klaren sein

to be of one or of the same mind — eines Sinnes (geh) or gleicher Meinung sein

I'm of the same mind as you — ich denke wie du, ich bin deiner Meinung

with one mind —

to my mind he's wrong — meiner Ansicht nach or nach meiner Meinung irrt er sich

7) = sanity Verstand m, Sinne pl

his mind was wandering (out of boredom etc) — seine Gedanken wanderten umher

to lose one's mind — verrückt werden, den Verstand verlieren

nobody in his right mind —

while the balance of his mind was disturbed (Jur) — wegen Verlusts des seelischen Gleichgewichts

8)

set structures __diams; in mind to bear or keep sth in mind — etw nicht vergessen; facts also, application etw im Auge behalten

to bear or keep sb in mind — an jdn denken; applicant also jdn im Auge behalten

with this in mind... — mit diesem Gedanken im Hinterkopf...

to have sb/sth in mind — an jdn/etw denken

to have in mind to do sth — vorhaben or im Sinn haben, etw zu tun

to have it in mind to do sth — beabsichtigen or sich (dat) vorgenommen haben, etw zu tun

it puts me in mind of sb/sth — es weckt in mir Erinnerungen an jdn/etw

to go out of one's mind — verrückt werden, den Verstand verlieren

to be out of one's mind — verrückt sein

to go out of one's mind with worry/grief — vor Sorge/Trauer den Verstand verlieren

to drive sb out of his mind — jdn um den Verstand bringen, jdn wahnsinnig machen

I'm bored out of my mind — ich langweile mich zu Tode

2. TRANSITIVE VERB

1) = look after aufpassen auf (+acc); sb's chair, seat frei halten

I'm minding the shop (fig) — ich sehe nach dem Rechten

2) = be careful of aufpassen auf (+acc); (= pay attention to) achten auf (+acc); (= act in accordance with) beachten

mind what you're doing! —

mind what you're doing with that car mind what I say! (= do as I tell you) — pass mit dem Auto auf lass dir das gesagt sein hör auf das, was ich dir sage

mind how you go — passen Sie auf, wo Sie hintreten

mind your language! — drück dich anständig aus!

mind the step! (Brit) — Vorsicht Stufe!

mind your head! (Brit) — Kopf einziehen (inf), Vorsicht, niedrige Tür/Decke etc

mind your feet! (Brit) (when sitting) — zieh die Füße ein!; (when moving) pass auf, wo du hintrittst!

mind your own business — kümmern Sie sich um Ihre eigenen Angelegenheiten

3) = care about sich kümmern um; (= object to) etwas haben gegen

she minds/doesn't mind it — es macht ihr etwas/nichts aus

I don't mind the cold — die Kälte macht mir nichts aus

I don't mind what he does —

I don't mind four but six is too many — ich habe nichts gegen vier, aber sechs sind zu viel

do you mind coming with me? — würde es dir etwas ausmachen mitzukommen?

would you mind opening the door? — wären Sie so freundlich, die Tür aufzumachen?

do you mind my smoking? —

I don't mind telling you, I was shocked — ich war schockiert, das kannst du mir glauben

I hope you don't mind my asking you/sitting here — ich hoffe, Sie haben nichts dagegen, wenn ich Sie frage/dass ich hier sitze

don't mind me — lass dich (durch mich) nicht stören; (iro) nimm auf mich keine Rücksicht

I wouldn't mind a cup of tea — ich hätte nichts gegen eine Tasse Tee

never mind the expense — (es ist) egal, was es kostet

never mind that now — das ist jetzt nicht wichtig, lass das doch jetzt

never mind your back, I'm worried about... — dein Rücken ist mir doch egal, ich mache mir Sorgen um...

never mind him — kümmere dich nicht um ihn

3. INTRANSITIVE VERB

1) = care, worry sich kümmern, sich (dat) etwas daraus machen; (= object) etwas dagegen haben

he doesn't seem to mind about anything —

I wish he minded a little — ich wünschte, es würde ihm etwas ausmachen or ihn ein bisschen kümmern

nobody seemed to mind — es schien keinem etwas auszumachen, niemand schien etwas dagegen zu haben

I'd prefer to stand, if you don't mind — ich würde lieber stehen, wenn es Ihnen recht ist

do you mind? — macht es Ihnen etwas aus?

do you mind! (iro) —

do you mind if I open or would you mind if I opened the window? — macht es Ihnen etwas aus, wenn ich das Fenster öffne?

I don't mind if I do — ich hätte nichts dagegen __diams; never mind macht nichts, ist doch egal; (in exasperation) ist ja auch egal, schon gut

never mind, you'll find another — mach dir nichts draus, du findest bestimmt einen anderen

oh, never mind, I'll do it myself — ach, lass (es) or schon gut, ich mache es selbst

never mind about that now! —

never mind about what you said to him, what did he say to you? — es ist doch egal or unwichtig, was du zu ihm gesagt hast, was hat er zu dir gesagt?

never mind about that mistake — mach dir nichts aus dem Fehler

never mind about your shoes (in exasperation) — deine Schuhe sind mir doch egal

I'm not going to finish school, never mind go to university — ich werde die Schule nicht beenden und schon gar nicht zur Universität gehen __diams; never you mind! kümmere du dich mal nicht darum

2) = be sure aufpassen

mind and see if... — sieh zu, ob...

mind you get that done — sieh zu, dass du das fertig bekommst

I'm not saying I'll do it, mind — ich will damit aber nicht sagen, dass ich es tue

he's not a bad lad, mind, just... — er ist eigentlich kein schlechter Junge, nur...

he didn't do it, mind — er hat es (ja) nicht getan __diams; mind you

mind you, I'd rather not go — ich würde eigentlich or allerdings lieber nicht gehen

it was raining at the time, mind you — allerdings hat es da geregnet

mind you, he did try/ask — er hat es immerhin versucht/hat immerhin gefragt

he's quite good, mind you — er ist eigentlich ganz gut

4. PHRASAL VERB

* * *

mind [maınd]

A s

1. Sinn m, Gemüt n, Herz n:

his mind was on her all time er musste die ganze Zeit an sie denken;

go through sb’s mind jemandem durch den Kopf gehen;

have sth on one’s mind etwas auf dem Herzen haben;

that might take his mind off his worries das lenkt ihn vielleicht von seinen Sorgen ab;

his mind was not fully on the job er war nicht ganz bei der Sache; → weight A 7

2. Seele f, Verstand m, Geist m:

before one’s mind’s eye vor seinem geistigen Auge;

see sth in one’s mind’s eye etwas im Geiste vor sich sehen;

be of sound mind, be in one’s right mind bei (vollem) Verstand sein;

anybody in their right mind jeder halbwegs Normale;

it is all in the mind das ist rein seelisch bedingt oder reine Einbildung (Krankheit etc);

of sound mind and memory JUR im Vollbesitz seiner geistigen Kräfte;

of unsound mind geistesgestört, unzurechnungsfähig;

be out of one’s mind nicht (recht) bei Sinnen sein, verrückt sein;

drive ( oder send) sb out of their mind jemanden verrückt machen;

lose one’s mind den Verstand verlieren;

close ( oder shut) one’s mind to sth sich gegen etwas verschließen;

have an open mind unvoreingenommen sein;

keep an open mind sich noch nicht festlegen;

cast back one’s mind sich zurückversetzen (to nach, in akk);

enter sb’s mind jemandem in den Sinn kommen;

give ( oder put, set) one’s mind to sth sich mit einer Sache befassen, sich einer Sache widmen;

pay no mind to nicht achten auf (akk);

put sth out of one’s mind sich etwas aus dem Kopf schlagen;

read sb’s mind jemandes Gedanken lesen;

set one’s mind on sth sich etwas in den Kopf setzen;

set one’s mind on doing sth es sich in den Kopf setzen, etwas zu tun;

it has slipped (from) my mind es ist mir entfallen; → blow¹ C 7, presence 1

3. Geist m ( auch PHIL):

the human mind;

things of the mind geistige Dinge;

his is a fine mind er hat einen feinen Verstand, er ist ein kluger Kopf;

one of the greatest minds of his time fig einer der größten Geister seiner Zeit;

the best minds in the country die klügsten Köpfe im Lande;

(the triumph of) mind over matter der Sieg des Geistes über die Materie; → history 1

4. Meinung f, Ansicht f:

in ( oder to) my mind

a) meiner Ansicht nach, meines Erachtens,

b) nach meinem Sinn oder Geschmack;

be of sb’s mind jemandes Meinung sein;

change one’s mind sich anders besinnen, es sich anders überlegen;

change one’s mind about seine Meinung ändern über (akk);

speak one’s mind (freely) seine Meinung frei äußern;

give sb a piece ( oder bit) of one’s mind jemandem gründlich die Meinung sagen;

know one’s (own) mind wissen, was man will;

be in (US of) two minds about mit sich selbst nicht einig sein über (akk);

there can be no two minds about it darüber kann es keine geteilte Meinung geben;

be of one mind einer Meinung sein (about, on über akk);

many men, many minds (Sprichwort) viele Köpfe, viele Sinne

5. Neigung f, Lust f, Absicht f:

have a good (half a) mind to do sth gute (nicht übel) Lust haben, etwas zu tun;

have sth in mind etwas im Sinn haben;

this is exactly what I had in mind das ist genau das, was mir vorschwebte oder was ich mir vorstellte;

I have you in mind ich denke (dabei) an dich;

have it in mind to do sth beabsichtigen, etwas zu tun;

make up one’s mind

a) sich entschließen, einen Entschluss fassen,

b) zu dem Schluss oder zu der Überzeugung kommen ( that dass), sich klar werden ( about über akk);

have you made up your mind yet? (im Restaurant) haben Sie schon gewählt?;

I can’t make up your mind! du musst deine Entscheidung(en) schon selbst treffen!

6. Erinnerung f, Gedächtnis n:

bear ( oder keep) sth in mind (immer) an eine Sache denken, etwas nicht vergessen, etwas bedenken, etwas im Auge halten;

bring back ( oder call) sth to mind

a) etwas ins Gedächtnis zurückrufen, an eine Sache erinnern,

b) sich etwas ins Gedächtnis zurückrufen, sich an eine Sache erinnern;

I can’t get it out of my mind ich muss ständig daran denken, es beschäftigt mich ständig;

it went ( right, umg clean) out of his mind er hat es (ganz oder total) vergessen;

put sb in mind of sth jemanden an etwas erinnern;

nothing comes to mind nichts fällt einem (dabei) ein;

from time out of mind seit undenklichen Zeiten; → erase 3, wipe out 2

7. Christian Science: Gott m

B v/t

1. beachten, achtgeben oder achten auf (akk):

mind you write umg denk daran oder vergiss nicht zu schreiben

2. achtgeben auf (akk), sich hüten vor (dat):

mind your head! stoß dir den Kopf nicht an!; → step A 1, A 7, A 9

3. sorgen für, sehen nach:

mind the fire nach dem Feuer sehen;

mind the children sich um die Kinder kümmern, die Kinder hüten oder beaufsichtigen;

mind your own business kümmere dich um deine eigenen Dinge!;

never mind him kümmere dich nicht um ihn!;

never you mind what … umg es geht dich gar nichts an, was …;

don’t mind me lassen Sie sich durch mich nicht stören!

4. etwas haben gegen, etwas nicht gern sehen oder mögen, sich stoßen an (dat):

do you mind my smoking? haben Sie etwas dagegen oder stört es Sie, wenn ich rauche?;

would you mind coming? würden Sie so freundlich sein zu kommen?;

she was, she didn’t mind admitting, very lonely sie war, wie sie unumwunden oder freimütig zugab, sehr einsam;

I don’t mind it ich habe nichts dagegen, meinetwegen, von mir aus (gern);

I would not mind a cup of coffee ich hätte nichts gegen eine Tasse Kaffee

5. schott sich erinnern an (akk)

C v/i

1. aufpassen:

mind (you)

a) wohlgemerkt,

b) allerdings;

he’s very nice, mind you, but … er ist eigentlich sehr nett, aber …;

never mind lass es gut sein!, es hat nichts zu sagen!, macht nichts!, schon gut! ( → C 2)

2. etwas dagegen haben:

I don’t mind ich habe nichts dagegen, meinetwegen, von mir aus (gern);

I don’t mind if he goes meinetwegen kann er gehen;

do you mind if I smoke? haben Sie etwas dagegen oder stört es Sie, wenn ich rauche?;

I don’t mind if I do umg

a) ja, ganz gern oder ich möchte schon,

b) ich bin so frei;

nobody seemed to mind es schien niemandem etwas auszumachen;

do you mind!

a) ich muss doch sehr bitten!,

b) passen Sie doch auf!;

do you mind!, can’t you see I’m busy? sehen Sie (denn) nicht, dass ich beschäftigt bin?;

he minds a great deal es macht ihm sehr viel aus, es stört ihn sehr;

never mind mach dir nichts draus! ( → C 1)

3. mind out Br aufpassen ( for auf akk)

* * *
1. noun
1) (remembrance)

bear or keep something in mind — an etwas (Akk.) denken; etwas nicht vergessen

have in mind to do something — vorhaben, etwas zu tun

bring something to mind — etwas in Erinnerung rufen

something comes into somebody's mind — jemandem fällt etwas ein

it went out of my mind — ich habe es vergessen; es ist mir entfallen

put something/somebody out of one's mind — etwas/jemanden aus seinem Gedächtnis streichen

2) (opinion)

give somebody a piece of one's mind — jemandem gründlich die Meinung sagen

in or to my mind — meiner Meinung od. Ansicht nach

be of one or of the same mind, be in one mind — einer Meinung sein

be in two minds about something — [sich (Dat.)] unschlüssig über etwas (Akk.) sein

change one's mind — seine Meinung ändern

have a mind of one's own — seinen eigenen Kopf haben

I have a good mind/half a mind to do that — ich hätte große Lust/nicht übel Lust, das zu tun

make up one's mind, make one's mind up — sich entscheiden

make up one's mind to do something — sich entschließen, etwas zu tun

read somebody's mind — jemandes Gedanken lesen

3) (direction of thoughts)

his mind is on other things — er ist mit den Gedanken woanders

give or put or turn one's mind to — sich konzentrieren auf (+ Akk.) [Arbeit, Aufgabe, Angelegenheit]

I have had somebody/something on my mind — jemand/etwas hat mich beschäftigt; (worried) ich habe mir Sorgen wegen jemandem/etwas gemacht

she has a lot of things on her mind — sie hat viele Sorgen

something preys or weighs on somebody's mind — etwas macht jemandem zu schaffen

take somebody's mind off something — jemanden von etwas ablenken

keep one's mind on something — sich auf etwas (Akk.) konzentrieren

close one's mind to something — sich einer Sache (Dat.) verschließen (geh.)

4) (way of thinking and feeling) Denkweise, die

frame of mind — [seelische] Verfassung

state of mind — [Geistes]zustand, der

be in a frame of mind to do something — in der Verfassung sein, etwas zu tun

have a logical mind — logisch denken

5) (seat of consciousness, thought, volition) Geist, der

it's all in the mind — es ist alles nur Einstellung

in one's mind — im stillen

in my mind's eye — vor meinem geistigen Auge; im Geiste

nothing could be further from my mind than... — nichts läge mir ferner, als...

6) (intellectual powers) Verstand, der; Intellekt, der

have a very good mind — einen klaren od. scharfen Verstand haben

great minds think alike — (joc.) große Geister denken [eben] gleich

7) (normal mental faculties) Verstand, der

lose or go out of one's mind — den Verstand verlieren

be out of one's mind — den Verstand verloren haben

in one's right mind — bei klarem Verstand
2. transitive verb
1) (heed)

don't mind what he says — gib nichts auf sein Gerede

mind what I say — glaub mir

let's do it, and never mind the expense — machen wir es doch, egal, was es kostet

2) (concern oneself about)

he minds a lot what people think of him — es ist für ihn sehr wichtig, was die Leute von ihm denken

I can't afford a bicycle, never mind a car — ich kann mir kein Fahrrad leisten, geschweige denn ein Auto

never mind him/that — (don't be anxious) er/das kann dir doch egal sein (ugs.)

never mind how/where... — es tut nichts zur Sache, wie/wo...

don't mind me — nimm keine Rücksicht auf mich; (don't let my presence disturb you) lass dich [durch mich] nicht stören; (iron.) nimm bloß keine Rücksicht auf mich

mind the doors! — Vorsicht an den Türen!

mind one's P's and Q's — sich anständig benehmen

3) usu. neg. or interrog. (object to)

did he mind being woken up? — hat es ihm was ausgemacht, aufgeweckt zu werden?

would you mind opening the door? — würdest du bitte die Tür öffnen?

do you mind my smoking? — stört es Sie od. haben Sie etwas dagegen, wenn ich rauche?

I wouldn't mind a walk — ich hätte nichts gegen einen Spaziergang

4) (remember and take care)

mind you don't leave anything behind — denk daran, nichts liegen lassen!

mind how you go! — pass auf! sei vorsichtig!; (as general farewell) mach's gut! (ugs.)

mind you get this work done — sieh zu, dass du mit dieser Arbeit fertig wirst!

5) (have charge of) aufpassen auf (+ Akk.)

mind the shop or (Amer.) the store — (fig.) sich um den Laden kümmern (ugs.)
3. intransitive verb
1)

mind! — Vorsicht!; Achtung!

2) usu. in imper. (take note)

follow the signposts, mind, or... — denk daran und halte dich an die Wegweiser, sonst...

I didn't know that, mind, or... — das habe ich allerdings nicht gewusst, sonst...

3) (care, object)

do you mind? — (may I?) hätten Sie etwas dagegen?; (please do not) ich muss doch sehr bitten

he doesn't mind about your using the car — er hat nichts dagegen, wenn Sie den Wagen benutzen

if you don't mind — wenn es dir recht ist

4) (give heed)

never [you] mind — (it's not important) macht nichts; ist nicht schlimm; (it's none of your business) sei nicht so neugierig

never mind: I can do it — schon gut - das kann ich machen

never mind about that now! — lass das jetzt mal [sein/liegen]!

never mind about him - what happened to her? — er interessiert mich nicht - was ist ihr passiert?

Phrasal Verbs:

- mind out

* * *

n.

Absicht -en f.

Ansicht -en f.

Geist -er m.

Gemüt -er n.

Meinung -en f.

Phantasie -n f.

Sinn -e m.

Verstand -¨e m. v.

beachten v.

English-german dictionary > mind
3 Mind-body Problem

   1) The Mind Is Entirely Distinct from Body

   From this I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 101)

   2) Critique of the Cartesian View

    still remains to be explained how that union and apparent intermingling [of mind and body]... can be found in you, if you are incorporeal, unextended and indivisible.... How, at least, can you be united with the brain, or some minute part in it, which (as has been said) must yet have some magnitude or extension, however small it be? If you are wholly without parts how can you mix or appear to mix with its minute subdivisions? For there is no mixture unless each of the things to be mixed has parts that can mix with one another. (Gassendi, 1970, p. 201)

   3) The Union That Exists between the Body and the Mind

   here are... certain things which we experience in ourselves and which should be attributed neither to the mind nor body alone, but to the close and intimate union that exists between the body and the mind.... Such are the appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of the mind which do not subsist in mind or thought alone... and finally all the sensations. (Descartes, 1970b, p. 238)

   4) Psychology Is Not the Study of Disembodied Minds

   With any other sort of mind, absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a particular body, or Mind not subject to the course of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do. (James, 1890, p. 183)

   5) Each Mental Event Can Be Reduced to a Neural Event

   [The] intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making these processes perspicuous and free from contradiction. (Freud, 1966, p. 295)

   6) The Thesis Is That the Mental Is Nomologically Irreducible

   The thesis is that the mental is nomologically irreducible: there may be true general statements relating the mental and the physical, statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are not lawlike (in a strong sense to be described). If by absurdly remote chance we were to stumble on a non-stochastic true psychophysical generalization, we would have no reason to believe it more than roughly true. (Davidson, 1970, p. 90)

   7) The Doctrine That Men Are Machines

   We can divide those who uphold the doctrine that men are machines, or a similar doctrine, into two categories: those who deny the existence of mental events, or personal experiences, or of consciousness;... and those who admit the existence of mental events, but assert that they are "epiphenomena"-that everything can be explained without them, since the material world is causally closed. (Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 5)

   8) Brain- Mind Interaction

   Mind affects brain and brain affects mind. That is the message, and by accepting it you commit yourself to a special view of the world. It is a view that shows the limits of the genetic imperative on what we turn out to be, both intellectually and emotionally. It decrees that, while the secrets of our genes express themselves with force throughout our lives, the effect of that information on our bodies can be inﬂuenced by our psychological history and beliefs about the world. And, just as important, the other side of the same coin argues that what we construct in our minds as objective reality may simply be our interpretations of certain bodily states dictated by our genes and expressed through our physical brains and body. Put differently, various attributes of mind that seem to have a purely psychological origin are frequently a product of the brain's interpreter rationalizing genetically driven body states. Make no mistake about it: this two-sided view of mind-brain interactions, if adopted, has implications for the management of one's personal life. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 229)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind-body Problem
4 Cognitive Science

   1) The Basic Idea of Cognitive Science

   The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense.... [P]eople and intelligent computers turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)

   2) Experimental Psychology, Theoretical Linguistics, and Computational Simulation of Cognitive Processes Are All Components of Cognitive Science

   I went away from the Symposium with a strong conviction, more intuitive than rational, that human experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics, and computer simulation of cognitive processes were all pieces of a larger whole, and that the future would see progressive elaboration and coordination of their shared concerns.... I have been working toward a cognitive science for about twenty years beginning before I knew what to call it. (G. A. Miller, 1979, p. 9)

   3) The Nature of Cognitive Science

    Cognitive Science studies the nature of cognition in human beings, other animals, and inanimate machines (if such a thing is possible). While computers are helpful within cognitive science, they are not essential to its being. A science of cognition could still be pursued even without these machines.

    Computer Science studies various kinds of problems and the use of computers to solve them, without concern for the means by which we humans might otherwise resolve them. There could be no computer science if there were no machines of this kind, because they are indispensable to its being. Artificial Intelligence is a special branch of computer science that investigates the extent to which the mental powers of human beings can be captured by means of machines.

   There could be cognitive science without artificial intelligence but there could be no artificial intelligence without cognitive science. One final caveat: In the case of an emerging new discipline such as cognitive science there is an almost irresistible temptation to identify the discipline itself (as a field of inquiry) with one of the theories that inspired it (such as the computational conception...). This, however, is a mistake. The field of inquiry (or "domain") stands to specific theories as questions stand to possible answers. The computational conception should properly be viewed as a research program in cognitive science, where "research programs" are answers that continue to attract followers. (Fetzer, 1996, pp. xvi-xvii)

   4) The Nature of Cognitive Science

   What is the nature of knowledge and how is this knowledge used? These questions lie at the core of both psychology and artificial intelligence.

   The psychologist who studies "knowledge systems" wants to know how concepts are structured in the human mind, how such concepts develop, and how they are used in understanding and behavior. The artificial intelligence researcher wants to know how to program a computer so that it can understand and interact with the outside world. The two orientations intersect when the psychologist and the computer scientist agree that the best way to approach the problem of building an intelligent machine is to emulate the human conceptual mechanisms that deal with language.... The name "cognitive science" has been used to refer to this convergence of interests in psychology and artificial intelligence....

   This working partnership in "cognitive science" does not mean that psychologists and computer scientists are developing a single comprehensive theory in which people are no different from machines. Psychology and artificial intelligence have many points of difference in methods and goals.... We simply want to work on an important area of overlapping interest, namely a theory of knowledge systems. As it turns out, this overlap is substantial. For both people and machines, each in their own way, there is a serious problem in common of making sense out of what they hear, see, or are told about the world. The conceptual apparatus necessary to perform even a partial feat of understanding is formidable and fascinating. (Schank & Abelson, 1977, pp. 1-2)

   5) The New Field of Cognitive Science

   Within the last dozen years a general change in scientific outlook has occurred, consonant with the point of view represented here. One can date the change roughly from 1956: in psychology, by the appearance of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin's Study of Thinking and George Miller's "The Magical Number Seven"; in linguistics, by Noam Chomsky's "Three Models of Language"; and in computer science, by our own paper on the Logic Theory Machine. (Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 4)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognitive Science
5 come into one's mind

(come into (или to) one's mind (тж. come to mind))

прийти в голову, на ум

He judged by the wondering look on her face that this was the first hint of natural science that had ever come to her mind. (U. Sinclair, ‘Oil!’, ch. IV) — По изумленному выражению ее лица Бенни понял, что его объяснение причин землетрясений было первой встречей Руфи с естественными науками.

He tried to think of something to say that would make her feel better, but nothing that came to mind seemed appropriate at the moment. (E. Caldwell, ‘Tragic Ground’, ch. XIV) — Ему хотелось сказать что-нибудь, чтобы подбодрить мисс Сондерс, но ничего подходящего не приходило в голову.

His son and daughter frequently came into his mind. (E. Caldwell, ‘A Lamp for Nightfall’, ch. XX) — Он часто думал о сыне и дочери.

Large English-Russian phrasebook > come into one's mind
6 make up one's mind

1) решиться, принять решение

Back in 1938 I started to study nuclear physics. Torn between two loves, science and literature, I could not make up my mind which field to choose. (R. E. Lapp, ‘Atoms and People’, ch. I) — я начал изучать ядерную физику еще в 1938 году. Меня в равной степени влекло и к точным наукам, и к литературе, и я долго не мог решить, по какому пути пойти.

‘But I oughtn't to conceal from you that I don't feel inclined to accept the Master's kind invitation.’ ‘Don't make up your mind yet.’ ‘I'm very much afraid it is made up,’ said Jago. (C. P. Snow, ‘The Affair’, ch. 24) — - Не стану скрывать от вас, - продолжал Яго, - что мне вовсе не улыбается принимать любезное приглашение ректора. - Подождите с окончательным решением. - Боюсь, что это вопрос уже решенный, - сказал Яго.

My mind is made up, and that's all there is to it. (E. Caldwell, ‘Jackpot’, ‘The People vs. Abe Lathan, Colored’) — Решение мое твердо, и говорить больше не о чем.

2) (to smth.) примириться с чем-л., свыкнуться с мыслью о чём-л.

After Julia had made up her mind to that she was glad. (W. S. Maugham, ‘Theatre’, ch. XXIII) — После того, как Джулия свыклась с мыслью об отъезде, она даже испытывала чувство радости.

The Maiden: "It is not the ageing that is so rapid. It is the realization of it when it has actually happened. Now that I have made up my mind to the fact that I have left childhood behind me, it comes home to me in leaps and bounds with every word you say." (B. Shaw, ‘Back to Methuselah’, part V) — Дева: "Не так быстро взрослеешь, как осознаешь, что стал взрослым. я уже свыклась с мыслью, что детство позади, но каждое наше слово будит воспоминания об ушедшей поре."

Large English-Russian phrasebook > make up one's mind
7 salvation (In Christian Science, the realization of the supremacy of infinite Mind over all bringing with it the destruction of the illusion of sin, sickness, and death)

Религия: торжество безграничного Разума над грехом, болезнями и смертью

Универсальный англо-русский словарь > salvation (In Christian Science, the realization of the supremacy of infinite Mind over all bringing with it the destruction of the illusion of sin, sickness, and death)
8 SOM

1) Военный термин: SACLANT staff organization manual, Software Operators Manual, Soldier of the Month, scheme of manoeuvre, standard operating manual, standoff missile

2) Техника: scanning optical microscope, self-orientation mechanism, shift operations manager, soundman, start of message character

3) Религия: Society Of Masks

4) Железнодорожный термин: Somerset Railroad Corporation

5) Грубое выражение: Sexy Old Man

6) Сокращение: Cushitic: East: Somali: SOMALI, Search-on-the-Move, See Our Message, Senior Officials' Meeting (ASEAN), Somali, Standard Operations Manual, Standing Group on the Oil Market

7) Университет: Science Of Mind

8) Электроника: System On Module

9) Вычислительная техника: Self-Organizing Machine, Structured Object Method, System Object Model (IBM), System Object Model (IBM, ORB, CORBA)

10) Нефть: sedimentary organic matter, soluble organic matter

11) Картография: Space Oblique Mercator ( projection) (проекция "искаженных площадей" Меркатора)

12) Банковское дело: Стокгольмская опционная биржа (Stockholm Option Market)

13) Транспорт: Self Organizing Map

14) Упаковка: сшитый мешок с открытым верхом

15) Фирменный знак: Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, LLP

16) СМИ: Society Opinion Media

17) Деловая лексика: Finnish Options Market, School Of Medicine, Secondary Operation Machine, Share Of Market

18) Инвестиции: Stockholm Option Market

19) Сетевые технологии: System Object Model, модель системных объектов, начало сообщения

20) Автоматика: shop order management

21) Сахалин Р: Statutory Operations Manual

22) Макаров: start of message (character)

23) Расширение файла: Quattro Pro Network serial numbers, Start of Message, System Object Model (IBM), Sort information (Paradox)

24) МИД: Senior Officials Meeting

25) Фантастика Sons Of The Moon, Subject Object Metaphysics

26) Аэропорты: San Tome, Venezuela

Универсальный англо-русский словарь > SOM
9 som

1) Военный термин: SACLANT staff organization manual, Software Operators Manual, Soldier of the Month, scheme of manoeuvre, standard operating manual, standoff missile

2) Техника: scanning optical microscope, self-orientation mechanism, shift operations manager, soundman, start of message character

3) Религия: Society Of Masks

4) Железнодорожный термин: Somerset Railroad Corporation

5) Грубое выражение: Sexy Old Man

6) Сокращение: Cushitic: East: Somali: SOMALI, Search-on-the-Move, See Our Message, Senior Officials' Meeting (ASEAN), Somali, Standard Operations Manual, Standing Group on the Oil Market

7) Университет: Science Of Mind

8) Электроника: System On Module

9) Вычислительная техника: Self-Organizing Machine, Structured Object Method, System Object Model (IBM), System Object Model (IBM, ORB, CORBA)

10) Нефть: sedimentary organic matter, soluble organic matter

11) Картография: Space Oblique Mercator ( projection) (проекция "искаженных площадей" Меркатора)

12) Банковское дело: Стокгольмская опционная биржа (Stockholm Option Market)

13) Транспорт: Self Organizing Map

14) Упаковка: сшитый мешок с открытым верхом

15) Фирменный знак: Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, LLP

16) СМИ: Society Opinion Media

17) Деловая лексика: Finnish Options Market, School Of Medicine, Secondary Operation Machine, Share Of Market

18) Инвестиции: Stockholm Option Market

19) Сетевые технологии: System Object Model, модель системных объектов, начало сообщения

20) Автоматика: shop order management

21) Сахалин Р: Statutory Operations Manual

22) Макаров: start of message (character)

23) Расширение файла: Quattro Pro Network serial numbers, Start of Message, System Object Model (IBM), Sort information (Paradox)

24) МИД: Senior Officials Meeting

25) Фантастика Sons Of The Moon, Subject Object Metaphysics

26) Аэропорты: San Tome, Venezuela

Универсальный англо-русский словарь > som
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■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.

■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).

■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.

■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.

■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.

■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
11 Philosophy

   1) There Are Ideas That Have Their Own True and Immutable Nature

   And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)

   2) Examine What Is within Our Reach

   Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)

   3) Modern Philosophy Starts with the Cartesian Catastrophe

   As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)

   4) The Rightful Claims of Philosophy

   It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the inﬂuence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic inﬂuences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)

   5) The Philosophy of Philosophy

   Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)

   6) Philosophy Is a Field Which Has Certain Central Questions

   I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)

   7) The Central Task of Philosophy

   What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.

   This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).

   The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....

   Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)

   8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science

   In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)

   9) The Enduring Value of Philosophy

   Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....

   Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)

    10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- Control

   In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
12 Artificial Intelligence

   1) Programs and the Complexity of Human Mental Processes

   In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Is an Engineering Discipline

   Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)

   3) A Sceptical View of Artificial Intelligence

   Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inﬂated predictions....

   When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)

   4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually

   Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the Program

   Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)

   6) The Meaning of a Symbolic Description

   What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   7) The Principle of Artificial Intelligence

   [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)

   8) Artificial Intelligence Recognizes the Need for Knowledge in Its Systems

   The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)

   9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form

   The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)

    10) There Are Many Types of Reasoning

   There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:

    Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins ﬂy? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can ﬂy, so robins probably can ﬂy."

    Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)

    11) Programs Are Beginning to Do Things That Critics Have Asserted to Be Impossible

   Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)

    12) The Synthesis of Man and Machine

   Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)

    13) The Thesis of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI)

   The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)

    14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation

   It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)

    15) Four Kinds of Artificial Intelligence

   We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.

   ♦ Nonpsychological AI

   Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.

   ♦ Weak Psychological AI

   Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.

   ♦ Strong Psychological AI

... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)

   ♦ Suprapsychological AI

   Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)

    16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts

   Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)

    17) Form and Content Are Not Fundamentally Different

   Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System

   Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence

   The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.

   The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)

    20) Mathematical Logic Provides the Basis for Theory in AI

   The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....

   AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)

    21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions

   In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)

    22) Definitions of Artificial Intelligence

   Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)

    23) The Computer Can Not Be a Model of the Mind

   Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)

    24) Computers Will Not Always Be Inferior to Human Brains

   The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
13 Psychology

   1) The Knowledge of Ourselves

   We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)

   2) As a Science, Psychology Is Distinct

   The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)

   3) Psychology Can Never Be an Exact Natural Science

   Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)

   4) How a " Mathematical" Psychology May Be Realized in Practice

   It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)

   5) The Rights of Psychology as Science

   "Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,

   6) The Study of Animal Psychology

   The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)

   7) The Behaviorist's Formulation

   The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)

   8) Man Is a Microcosm

   According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)

   9) Brief Overview of Psychology's History

   At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.

   In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.

   The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.

   Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)

    10) Psychological Research Is Not Building toward Systematic Clarity

   As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)

    11) Psychology as a Scientific Discipline

   The subject matter of psychology is as old as reﬂection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychology
14 Knowledge

   1) To Exist Is to Be Perceived

   It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)

   2) Abstract Science or Demonstration Is a More Perfect Species of Knowledge

   It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.

   But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reﬂection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)

   3) Knowledge Derives from Two Fundamental Sources of the Mind

   Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).

   Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])

   4) The Means by Which Metaphysics Can Be Perfected as a Science

   Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....

   This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)

   5) Knowledge Is Only Real in the Form of System

   Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)

   6) Knowledge, Action, and Evaluation Are Interconnected

   Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)

   7) The Evolution of Knowledge

   "Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.

   Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge
15 open

1. adjective
1) offen

with the window open — bei geöffnetem Fenster

be [wide/half] open — [weit/halb] offen stehen

hold the door open [for somebody] — [jemandem] die Tür aufhalten

push/pull/kick the door open — die Tür aufstoßen/aufziehen/eintreten

force something open — etwas mit Gewalt öffnen

with one's mouth open — mit offenem Mund

have one's eyes open — die Augen geöffnet haben

[not] be able to keep one's eyes open — [nicht mehr] die Augen offenhalten können; see also academic.ru/26032/eye">eye 1. 1)

2) (unconfined) offen [Gelände, Feuer]

on the open road — auf freier Strecke

in the open air — im Freien

3) (ready for business or use)

be open — [Laden, Museum, Bank usw.:] geöffnet sein

‘open’/‘open on Sundays’ — "geöffnet"/"Sonntags geöffnet"

4) (accessible) offen; öffentlich [Treffen, Rennen]; (available) frei [Stelle]; freibleibend [Angebot]

lay open — offen legen [Plan]

be open to the public — für die Öffentlichkeit zugänglich sein

the offer remains open until the end of the month — das Angebot bleibt bestehen od. gilt noch bis Ende des Monats

keep a position open for somebody — jemandem eine Stelle freihalten

5)

be open to — (exposed to) ausgesetzt sein (+ Dat.) [Wind, Sturm]; (receptive to) offen sein für [Ratschlag, andere Meinung, Vorschlag]

I hope to sell it for £1,000, but I am open to offers — ich möchte es für 1 000 Pfund verkaufen, aber ich lasse mit mir handeln

lay oneself [wide] open to criticism — etc. sich der Kritik usw. aussetzen

be open to question/doubt/argument — fraglich/zweifelhaft/umstritten sein

6) (undecided) offen

have an open mind about or on something — einer Sache gegenüber aufgeschlossen sein

with an open mind — aufgeschlossen

leave something open — etwas offen lassen

7) (undisguised, manifest) unverhohlen [Bewunderung, Hass]; offen [Verachtung, Empörung, Widerstand]; offensichtlich [Spaltung, Zwiespalt]

open war/warfare — offener Krieg/Kampf

8) (frank) offen [Wesen, Streit, Abstimmung, Gesicht]; (not secret) öffentlich [Wahl]

be open [about something/with somebody] — [in Bezug auf etwas (Akk.) /gegenüber jemandem] offen sein

9) (expanded, unfolded) offen, geöffnet [Pore, Regenschirm]; aufgeblüht [Blume, Knospe]; aufgeschlagen [Zeitung, Landkarte, Stadtplan]

somebody/something is an open book [to somebody] — (fig.) jemand/etwas ist ein aufgeschlagenes od. offenes Buch [für jemanden]
2. noun
in the open — (outdoors) unter freiem Himmel

[out] in the open — (fig.) [öffentlich] bekannt

come [out] into the open — (fig.) (become obvious) herauskommen (ugs.); (speak out) offen sprechen

bring something [out] into the open — (fig.) etwas an die Öffentlichkeit bringen
3. transitive verb
1) öffnen; aufmachen (ugs.)

open something with a key — etwas aufschließen

2) (allow access to)

open something [to somebody/something] — etwas öffnen [für jemanden/etwas]; (fig.) [jemandem/einer Sache] etwas öffnen

open something to the public — etwas der Öffentlichkeit (Dat.) zugänglich machen

3) (establish) eröffnen [Konferenz, Kampagne, Diskussion, Laden]; beginnen [Verhandlungen, Krieg, Spiel]; (declare open) eröffnen [Gebäude usw.]

open an account — ein Konto eröffnen

open fire [on somebody/something] — das Feuer [auf jemanden/etwas] eröffnen

4) (unfold, spread out) aufschlagen [Zeitung, Landkarte, Stadtplan, Buch]; aufspannen, öffnen [Schirm]; öffnen [Fallschirm, Poren]

open one's arms [wide] — die od. seine Arme [weit] ausbreiten

5) (reveal, expose)

something opens new horizons/a new world to somebody — (fig.) etwas eröffnet jemandem neue Horizonte/eine neue Welt

6) (make more receptive)

open one's heart or mind to somebody/something — sich jemandem/einer Sache öffnen

open somebody's mind to something — jemandem etwas nahe bringen
4. intransitive verb
1) sich öffnen; aufgehen; [Spalt, Kluft:] sich auftun

‘Doors open at 7 p.m.’ — "Einlass ab 19 Uhr"

open inwards/outwards — nach innen/außen aufgehen

the door would not open — die Tür ging nicht auf od. ließ sich nicht öffnen

his eyes opened wide — er riss die Augen weit auf

open into/on to something — zu etwas führen

the kitchen opens into the living room — die Küche hat eine Tür zum Wohnzimmer

2) (become open to customers) öffnen; aufmachen (ugs.); (start trading etc.) eröffnet werden

the shop does not open on Sundays — der Laden ist sonntags geschlossen

3) (make a start) beginnen; [Ausstellung:] eröffnet werden

Phrasal Verbs:

- open out

- open up
•• Cultural note:
Open University - OU

Eine britische Fernuniversität, die 1969 gegründet wurde und vor allem Berufstätigen im Fernstudium Kurse auf verschiedenem Niveau bietet, insbesondere wissenschaftliche und berufliche Fortbildungsprogramme. Studenten jeder Altersgruppe, selbst solche ohne die erforderlichen Schulabschlüsse, können das Studium nach vier oder fünf Jahren mit dem Bachelor's degree und dem Master's degree abschließen. Teilnehmer studieren von zu Hause - teilweise mittels audiovisueller Medien - schicken ihre Arbeit ein und erhalten eine Rückantwort von ihrem tutor (Dozent). Studenten können auch am Direktunterricht mit wöchentlichen Seminaren in Studienzentren und an Sommerschulen teilnehmen. Nach dem erfolgreichen Vorbild der Open University gibt es inzwischen auch in anderen Teilen der Welt ähnliche Fortbildungsprogramme

* * *
['əupən] 1. adjective
1) (not shut, allowing entry or exit: an open box; The gate is wide open.) offen

2) (allowing the inside to be seen: an open book.) offen

3) (ready for business etc: The shop is open on Sunday afternoons; After the fog had cleared, the airport was soon open again; The gardens are open to the public.) geöffnet

4) (not kept secret: an open show of affection.) offen

5) (frank: He was very open with me about his work.) offen

6) (still being considered etc: Leave the matter open.) offen

7) (empty, with no trees, buildings etc: I like to be out in the open country; an open space.) offen
2. verb
1) (to make or become open: He opened the door; The door opened; The new shop opened last week.) öffnen

2) (to begin: He opened the meeting with a speech of welcome.) eröffnen

•

- opener
- opening
- openly
- open-air
- open-minded
- open-plan
- be an open secret
- bring something out into the open
- bring out into the open
- in the open
- in the open air
- keep/have an open mind
- open on to
- the open sea
- open to
- open up
- with open arms
* * *

open

[ˈəʊp^ən, AM ˈoʊ-]

I. adj

1. inv (not closed) container, eyes, garment, door, window offen, auf präd; pass also geöffnet, für den Verkehr freigegeben; book aufgeschlagen; flower aufgeblüht, erblüht; map auseinandergefaltet

she was breathing through her \open mouth sie atmete durch den offenen Mund

excuse me, your fly is \open entschuldige, aber dein Hosenstall steht offen fam

I had difficulty keeping my eyes \open ich konnte die Augen kaum noch offenhalten

to welcome sb with \open arms ( fig) jdn mit offenen Armen empfangen [o aufnehmen]

\open boat Boot nt ohne Verdeck

to do sth with one's eyes \open etw ganz bewusst tun

I got into this job with my eyes \open als ich diesen Job angenommen habe, war mir klar, was mich erwartet

an \open wound eine offene Wunde

wide \open [sperrangel]weit geöffnet

to burst \open bag, case aufgehen

to push sth \open etw aufstoßen; (violently) etw mit Gewalt öffnen

2. inv, pred (for customers, visitors) shop, bar, museum geöffnet, offen

is the supermarket \open yet? hat der Supermarkt schon auf?

is that new computer store \open for business yet? hat dieser neue Computerladen schon aufgemacht?

to declare sth for \open etw für eröffnet erklären

3. inv (not yet decided) case, decision, question offen

the race is still wide \open bei dem Rennen ist noch alles drin

the price is \open to negotiation über den Preis kann noch verhandelt werden

to be \open to interpretation Interpretationsspielraum bieten

an \open matter eine schwebende Angelegenheit [o offene Sache]

an \open mind eine unvoreingenommene Einstellung

to have/keep an \open mind unvoreingenommen [o objektiv] sein/bleiben

she has a very \open mind about new things sie steht neuen Dingen sehr aufgeschlossen gegenüber

to keep one's options \open sich dat alle Möglichkeiten offenhalten

an \open question eine offene Frage

\open ticket Ticket nt mit offenem Reisedatum

to leave sth \open etw offenlassen

4. inv (not enclosed) offen

to be in the \open air an der frischen Luft sein

to get out in the \open air an die frische Luft gehen

\open country unbebautes Land

\open field freies Feld

on the \open road auf freier Strecke

on the \open sea auf hoher See [o dem offenem Meer

5. inv (accessible to all) offen, öffentlich zugänglich

this library is not \open to the general public dies ist keine öffentliche Bibliothek

the competition is \open to anyone over the age of sixteen an dem Wettbewerb kann jeder teilnehmen, der älter als 16 Jahre ist

the job is \open to all applicants die Stelle steht allen Bewerbern offen

to have \open access to sth freien Zugang zu etw dat haben

in \open court in öffentlicher Verhandlung

an \open discussion eine öffentliche Diskussion

6. inv (not concealed) offen

\open hostility offene Feindschaft

\open resentment unverhohlene Abneigung

an \open scandal ein öffentlicher Skandal

to lay sth \open etw offenlegen

7. inv, pred (frank) person offen

he is quite \open about his weaknesses er spricht freimütig über seine Schwächen

▪ to be \open with sb offen zu jdm sein

an \open person ein offener [o aufrichtiger] Mensch

8. inv, pred (willing to accept)

▪ to be \open to sth für etw akk offen sein

\open to offers Angebote werden entgegengenommen

the company is \open to offers for the empty factory die Firma zieht Angebote für die leer stehende Fabrik in Betracht

to be \open to advice/new ideas/suggestions Ratschlägen/neuen Ideen/Vorschlägen gegenüber aufgeschlossen [o offen] sein

to be \open to bribes/offers/persuasion für Bestechung/Angebote/Überredung zugänglich sein

9. inv (available) frei, verfügbar; offer freibleibend

our offer will be kept \open until the end of the week unser Angebot gilt noch [o bleibt noch bestehen] bis Ende der Woche

there are still lots of opportunities \open to you dir stehen noch viele Möglichkeiten offen

it is \open to you to accept or to refuse the offer es steht Ihnen frei, das Angebot anzunehmen oder abzulehnen

the line is \open now die Leitung ist jetzt frei

to keep a bank account \open ein Bankkonto [weiterhin] bestehen lassen

\open time verfügbare Zeit

\open vacancies offene [o freie] Stellen

10. inv, pred (exposed) offen, ungeschützt; MIL ungedeckt, ohne Deckung

▪ to be \open to sth etw dat ausgesetzt sein

his macho attitude leaves him \open to ridicule mit seinem Machogehabe gibt er sich selbst der Lächerlichkeit preis

to be \open to attack Angriffen ausgesetzt sein

to be \open to criticism kritisierbar sein

to be \open to doubt zweifelhaft [o fraglich] sein

to be \open to the enemy feindlichem Zugriff unterliegen

to lay oneself \open to sth sich akk etw dat aussetzen

11. inv SPORT offen

\open champion Sieger(in) m(f) einer offenen Meisterschaft

\open championship offene Meisterschaften pl

12. inv SPORT (unprotected) game, style of play frei, ungedeckt

13. inv (letting in air) durchlässig, porös

an \open screen ein Drahtgitter [o Drahtnetz] nt

an \open weave eine lockere Webart

14. inv MUS

\open note Grundton m

\open pipe offene [Orgel]pfeife

\open string leere Saite

15. inv ELEC

\open circuit unterbrochener Stromkreislauf

16. inv MED (not constipated) bowels nicht verstopft, frei

17. inv BRIT FIN (not crossed)

\open cheque Barscheck m, Barcheck m SCHWEIZ

18. inv (free of ice) port, river eisfrei; weather, winter frostfrei

19. LING offen

\open syllable offene Silbe

\open vowel offener Vokal

20. MATH

\open set offene Menge

21.

▶ to be an \open book person [wie] ein aufgeschlagenes [o offenes] Buch sein; thing ein Kinderspiel sein

computers are an \open book to him mit Computern hat er überhaupt kein Probleme

II. vi

1. (from closed) sich akk öffnen, aufgehen

the door \opens much more easily now die Tür lässt sich jetzt viel leichter öffnen

the flowers \open in the morning die Blüten öffnen sich am Morgen

I can't get the door to \open! ich kann die Tür nicht aufkriegen!

2. (give access)

▪ to \open onto sth [direkt] zu etw dat führen

the door \opens into the garden die Tür führt direkt in den Garten

▪ to \open off sth zu etw dat hinführen

the small path \opened off the main road der schmale Weg führte auf die Hauptstraße

3. (for service) öffnen, aufmachen fam

the cafe \opens at ten o'clock das Café öffnet um zehn Uhr

4. (start) piece of writing or music, story beginnen, anfangen; film anlaufen; play Premiere haben

the trial \opens/the Olympic Games \open tomorrow der Prozess wird/die Olympischen Spiele werden morgen eröffnet

the film \opens in New York next week der Film läuft nächste Woche in New York an

who's going to \open? (in cards) wer kommt raus?, wer hat das Ausspiel?; STOCKEX

the shares \opened lower bei Börsenbeginn standen die Aktien niedriger

5. (become visible) sich akk zeigen

the valley \opened before them das Tal tat sich vor ihnen auf

6. (start new business) eröffnen, aufmachen, aufgehen SCHWEIZ

III. n

1. no pl (out of doors)

▪ [out] in the \open draußen; (in the open air) im Freien

to camp in the \open unter freiem Himmel nächtigen

2. no pl (not secret)

to bring sth out into the \open etw publikmachen [o an die Öffentlichkeit bringen]

to come out into the \open ans Licht kommen, auskommen SCHWEIZ, ruchbar werden geh

to get sth [out] in[to] the \open etw [offen] zur Sprache bringen [o ansprechen

3. SPORT (competition)

▪ the O\open [offene] Meisterschaft, Open nt fachspr

IV. vt

1. (change from closed)

to \open a book/magazine/newspaper ein Buch/ein Magazin/eine Zeitung aufschlagen

to \open a box/window/bottle eine Dose/ein Fenster/eine Flasche aufmachen [o öffnen]

to \open the curtains [or drapes] die Vorhänge aufziehen

to \open the door [or doors] to sth ( fig) neue Perspektiven [o Möglichkeiten] für etw akk eröffnen

to \open one's eyes seine Augen öffnen [o aufmachen]

to \open one's home to sb jdn bei sich dat aufnehmen

to \open a letter/file einen Brief/eine Akte öffnen

to \open a map eine [Straßen]karte auffalten

to \open one's mouth ( also fig) den Mund aufmachen, etw ausplaudern [o SCHWEIZ ausbringen]

to \open a vein ( hum) zum Strick greifen hum

2. (begin)

to \open fire MIL das Feuer eröffnen

to \open a meeting/rally ein Treffen/eine Kundgebung eröffnen

to \open negotiations in Verhandlungen eintreten

to \open the proceedings das Verfahren eröffnen

3. (set up)

to \open a bank account ein Konto einrichten [o eröffnen]

to \open a business/branch ein Geschäft/eine Zweigstelle eröffnen [o aufmachen

4. (for customers, visitors) öffnen

the company will open its doors for business next month die Firma wird im nächsten Monat eröffnet

to \open a bakery/book store/restaurant eine Bäckerei/einen Buchladen/ein Restaurant öffnen

5. (declare ready for use)

to \open a building ein Gebäude einweihen

to \open a road/tunnel eine Straße/einen Tunnel für den Verkehr freigeben

6. (break new ground)

▪ to \open sth etw erschließen

to \open a new field of science wissenschaftliches Neuland erschließen

7. (evacuate)

to \open one's bowels den Darm entleeren

8. (clear blockages)

▪ to \open sth:

the security team \opened a way through the crowd for the president das Sicherheitsteam bahnte dem Präsidenten einen Weg durch die Menge

to \open a canal einen Kanal passierbar machen

to \open a pipe ein Rohr durchgängig machen

to \open the view den Blick [o die Sicht] ermöglichen

9.

▶ to \open sb's eyes to sb/sth jdm die Augen über jdn/etw öffnen

▶ to \open the floodgates [to sb/sth] [jdm/etw] Tür und Tor öffnen pej

▶ to \open one's heart to sb jdm sein Herz ausschütten, sich akk jdm anvertrauen

▶ to \open one's mind offener [o SCHWEIZ meist aufgeschlossener] werden

* * *
['əUpən]
1. adj

1) door, bottle, book, eye, flower etc offen, auf pred, geöffnet; circuit offen; lines of communication frei; wound etc offen

to keep/hold the door open — die Tür offen lassen or auflassen/offen halten or aufhalten

to fling or throw the door open —

I can't keep my eyes open — ich kann die Augen nicht offen halten or aufhalten

the window flew open —

the thugs split his head open — die Schläger brachten ihm eine klaffende Wunde am Kopf bei

his defeat blew the competition wide open — durch seine Niederlage war der Ausgang des Wettbewerbs weit offen

a shirt open at the neck — ein am Hals offenes Hemd

2) (= open for business shop, bank etc) geöffnet

the baker/baker's shop is open — der Bäcker hat/der Bäckerladen ist or hat geöffnet or hat auf (inf)

3) (= not enclosed) offen; country, ground offen, frei; view frei; carriage, car offen, ohne Verdeck

in the open air — im Freien

on open ground — auf offenem or freiem Gelände

4) (= not blocked) Ling offen; road, canal, pores offen, frei (to für), geöffnet; rail track, river frei (to für); (MUS) string leer; pipe offen

open note — Grundton m

have you had your bowels open today? ( Med form ) — haben Sie heute Stuhlgang gehabt?

open to traffic/shipping — für den Verkehr/die Schifffahrt freigegeben

"road open to traffic" — "Durchfahrt frei"

5) (= officially in use) building eingeweiht; road, bridge (offiziell) freigegeben; exhibition eröffnet

to declare sth open — etw einweihen/freigeben/für eröffnet erklären

6) (= not restricted, accessible) letter, scholarship offen; market, competition offen, frei; (= public) meeting, trial öffentlich

to be open to sb (competition, membership, possibility) — jdm offenstehen; (admission) jdm freistehen; (place) für jdn geöffnet sein; (park)

my house is always open to you — mein Haus steht dir immer offen

the director's door is always open — die Tür des Direktors ist immer offen

in open court (Jur) — in öffentlicher Verhandlung

open to the public — der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich

park open to the public — öffentlicher Park

open forum — öffentliches Forum

she gave us an open invitation to visit — sie lud uns ein, jederzeit bei ihr vorbeizukommen

an unlocked window is an open invitation to a thief — ein unverschlossenes Fenster lädt geradezu zum Diebstahl ein

7)

to be open to advice/suggestions/ideas — Ratschlägen/Vorschlägen/Ideen zugänglich sein or gegenüber offen sein

I'm open to persuasion — ich lasse mich gern überreden

I'm open to offers — ich lasse gern mit mir handeln or reden

open to bribes — Bestechungen zugänglich

8) (= not filled) evening, time frei; job, post frei, offen

9) (= not concealed) campaign, secret, resistance offen; hostility offen, unverhüllt

10) (= not decided or settled) question offen, ungeklärt, ungelöst

they left the matter open — sie ließen die Angelegenheit offen or ungeklärt

to keep one's options open — es offenlassen

to keep an open mind — alles offenlassen; (judge, jury) unvoreingenommen sein

to have an open mind on sth — einer Sache (dat) aufgeschlossen gegenüberstehen

keep your mind open to new suggestions — verschließen Sie sich neuen Vorschlägen nicht

to be open to debate — zur Debatte stehen

11) (= exposed, not protected) (MIL) town offen; coast ungeschützt

a position open to attack — eine exponierte or leicht angreifbare Position

open to the elements — Wind und Wetter ausgesetzt

to be open to criticism/attack — der Kritik/Angriffen ausgesetzt sein

to lay oneself open to criticism/attack — sich der Kritik/Angriffen aussetzen

he left himself wide open to criticism — er setzte sich breiter Kritik aus

a theory open to criticism — eine anfechtbare Theorie

to be open to abuse — sich leicht missbrauchen lassen

to be open to doubt — anzweifelbar sein

12) weave locker; fabric, pattern durchbrochen

13) (= frank) character, face, person offen, aufrichtig

he was open with us — er war ganz offen mit uns

2. n

it's all out in the open now — nun ist alles heraus (inf), nun ist es alles zur Sprache gekommen

to bring sth out into the open — mit etw nicht länger hinterm Berg halten

to come out into the open ( fig, person ) — Farbe bekennen, sich erklären; (affair)

he eventually came out into the open about what he meant to do — er rückte endlich mit der Sprache heraus (inf), was er tun wollte

to force sb out into the open — jdn zwingen, sich zu stellen; (fig) jdn zwingen, Farbe zu bekennen

to force sth out into the open (fig) — etw zur Sprache bringen

3. vt

1) door, mouth, bottle, letter etc öffnen, aufmachen (inf); book aufschlagen, öffnen; newspaper aufschlagen; throttle, circuit öffnen

he didn't open his mouth once — er hat kein einziges Mal den Mund aufgemacht (inf)

to open ranks (Mil) — weg- or abtreten

2) (officially) exhibition eröffnen; building einweihen; motorway (für den Verkehr) freigeben

3) region erschließen

they opened a road through the mountains — durch die Berge wurde eine Straße gebaut

4) (= reveal, unfold) öffnen

to open one's heart to sb — sich jdm eröffnen (geh), jdm sein Herz aufschließen (geh)

to open sb's mind — jds Horizont erweitern

open your mind to new possibilities — öffnen Sie sich (dat) den Blick für neue Möglichkeiten

it had opened new horizons for him — dadurch erschlossen sich ihm neue Horizonte

5) (= start) case, trial, account eröffnen; debate, conversation etc beginnen

6) (= set up) shop eröffnen, aufmachen (inf); school einrichten

7) (MED) pores öffnen

to open the bowels (person) — Stuhlgang haben; (medicine) abführen

8)

to open fire (Mil) — das Feuer eröffnen (on auf +acc )

4. vi

1) aufgehen; (eyes) sich öffnen; (door, flower, book, wound, pores, window) sich öffnen, aufgehen

I couldn't get the box/bottle to open — ich habe die Schachtel/Flasche nicht aufbekommen

it won't open — es geht nicht auf

2) (shop, museum) öffnen, aufmachen

3) (= afford access door) führen (into in +acc)

the two rooms open into one another — diese zwei Zimmer sind durch eine Tür verbunden

See:

→ also open on to

4) (= start) beginnen (with mit); (CARDS, CHESS) eröffnen

the play opens next week — das Stück wird ab nächster Woche gegeben

when the play opened in Hull — bei der ersten Vorstellung in Hull

* * *

open [ˈəʊpən]

A s

1. the open

a) das offene Land,

b) die offene oder hohe See,

c) der freie Himmel:

in the open im Freien, unter freiem Himmel, in der freien Natur, an der frischen Luft, (Bergbau) über Tag

2. the open die Öffentlichkeit:

bring into the open an die Öffentlichkeit bringen;

come into the open fig

a) sich zeigen, hervorkommen,

b) sich erklären, offen reden, Farbe bekennen,

c) an die Öffentlichkeit treten ( with sth mit etwas);

draw sb into the open jemanden hervorlocken, jemanden aus seinem Versteck locken

3. besonders Golf, Tennis: (für Amateure und Profis) offenes Turnier:

the French Open pl die French Open pl

B adj (adv openly)

1. allg offen (Buch, Fenster, Flasche etc):

sleep with the window open bei offenem Fenster schlafen;

open chain CHEM offene Kette;

open prison JUR offenes Gefängnis;

open visibility SCHIFF klare Sicht;

the door is open die Tür ist oder steht offen, die Tür ist geöffnet oder umg auf;

cut open aufschneiden;

get open eine Tür etc aufbekommen, -bringen;

hold the door open for sb jemandem die Tür aufhalten;

keep ( oder leave) open eine Tür etc auflassen;

keep one’s eyes open fig die Augen offen halten;

pull open eine Schublade etc aufziehen;

throw open eine Tür etc aufreißen, -stoßen ( → B 7);

with open eyes mit offenen Augen (a. fig); → arm¹ Bes Redew, book A 1, bowel A 1 b, door Bes Redew, order A 5, punctuation 1

2. MED offen (Tuberkulose, Wunde etc)

3. offen, frei, zugänglich:

open country offenes Gelände;

open field freies Feld;

open sea offenes Meer, hohe See;

open spaces öffentliche Plätze (Parkanlagen etc); → air¹ A 1

4. frei, offen:

an open car ein offener Wagen;

open motor ELEK offener oder ungeschützter Motor;

lay open bloß-, freilegen ( → B 11)

5. offen, eisfrei (Hafen, Wasser etc):

open winter frostfreier Winter

6. geöffnet, offen, präd auch auf umg:

the shop ( museum, etc) is open;

the lines are open from … to … Sie können von … bis … anrufen;

we are open wir haben geöffnet

7. fig offen (to für), öffentlich, (jedem) zugänglich:

be open to offenstehen (dat);

throw open

a) der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich machen,

b) zugänglich machen (to dat, für)( → B 1);

open tournament → A 3;

open competition freier Wettbewerb;

open letter offener Brief;

open market WIRTSCH offener oder freier Markt;

open position freie oder offene (Arbeits)Stelle;

open sale öffentliche Versteigerung;

open session öffentliche Sitzung;

open for subscription WIRTSCH zur Zeichnung aufgelegt;

open to the public für die Öffentlichkeit zugänglich;

open to traffic für den Verkehr freigegeben;

in open court JUR in öffentlicher Sitzung oder Verhandlung

8. fig zugänglich, aufgeschlossen ( beide:

to für oder dat):

be open to suggestions für Vorschläge offen sein; → bribery, conviction 2, mind A 2

9. fig ausgesetzt, unterworfen ( beide:

to der Kritik etc):

open to question anfechtbar;

open to temptation anfällig gegen die Versuchung;

lay o.s. open to criticism sich der Kritik aussetzen;

leave o.s. wide open to sb sich jemandem gegenüber eine (große) Blöße geben;

that is open to argument darüber lässt sich streiten;

be open to different interpretations verschiedene Deutungen zulassen; → misconstruction 1

10. offen(kundig), unverhüllt (Verachtung etc):

an open secret ein offenes Geheimnis

11. offen, freimütig:

I will be open with you ich will ganz offen mit Ihnen reden;

open and aboveboard offen und ehrlich;

lay open

a) offen darlegen,

b) aufdecken, enthüllen ( → B 4)

12. unentschieden, offen (Frage, Kampf etc)

13. fig frei (ohne Verbote):

open pattern JUR ungeschütztes Muster;

open season Jagd-, Fischzeit f (Ggs Schonzeit)

14. frei (Zeit):

keep a day open sich einen Tag freihalten

15. lückenhaft (Gebiss etc):

open population geringe Bevölkerungsdichte

16. durchbrochen (Gewebe, Handarbeit)

17. WIRTSCH laufend (Konto, Kredit, Rechnung):

open cheque Br Barscheck m

18. LING offen (Silbe, Vokal):

open consonant Reibelaut m

19. MUS

a) weit (Lage, Satz)

b) leer (Saite etc):

open harmony weiter Satz;

open note Grundton m (einer Saite etc)

20. TYPO licht:

open matter lichter oder weit durchschossener Satz;

open type Konturschrift f

C v/t

1. allg öffnen, aufmachen, die Augen, ein Buch auch aufschlagen:

open the circuit ELEK den Stromkreis ausschalten oder unterbrechen;

open one’s mouth fig den Mund aufmachen; → bowel A 1 b, door Bes Redew

2. eröffnen ( an account WIRTSCH ein Konto; a business WIRTSCH ein Geschäft; a credit WIRTSCH einen Kredit oder ein Akkreditiv; the debate die Debatte; fire MIL das Feuer [ at, on auf akk]; a prospect eine Aussicht):

open an account auch ein Konto anlegen;

open the case JUR die Verhandlung (durch Vortrag des eigenen Standpunkts) eröffnen;

open new markets WIRTSCH neue Märkte erschließen;

open negotiations Verhandlungen anknüpfen, in Verhandlungen eintreten;

open a road to traffic eine Straße dem Verkehr übergeben;

open diplomatic relations POL diplomatische Beziehungen aufnehmen

3. aufschneiden, -stechen, öffnen ( alle auch MED)

4. Gefühle, Gedanken enthüllen, seine Absichten kundtun:

open o.s. to sb sich jemandem mitteilen; → heart Bes Redew

5. JUR in der Schwebe lassen:

open a judg(e)ment beschließen, eine nochmalige Verhandlung über eine bereits gefällte Entscheidung zuzulassen

6. besonders SCHIFF ein bisher verdecktes Objekt in Sicht bekommen

D v/i

1. sich öffnen oder auftun, aufgehen (Tür etc):

“doors open at 7 p.m.” „Einlass ab 19 Uhr“; → heaven 4

2. (to) fig sich (dem Auge, Geist etc) erschließen oder zeigen oder auftun

3. führen, gehen (Fenster, Tür)

4. fig

a) anfangen, beginnen (Börse, Schule etc)

b) öffnen, aufmachen (Laden, Büro etc)

c) anlaufen (Film), eröffnen (Ausstellung etc)

d) (einen Brief, seine Rede) beginnen ( with mit)

5. a) allg öffnen

b) das Buch aufschlagen:

let’s open at page 50

6. SCHIFF in Sicht kommen

* * *
1. adjective
1) offen

with the window open — bei geöffnetem Fenster

be [wide/half] open — [weit/halb] offen stehen

hold the door open [for somebody] — [jemandem] die Tür aufhalten

push/pull/kick the door open — die Tür aufstoßen/aufziehen/eintreten

force something open — etwas mit Gewalt öffnen

with one's mouth open — mit offenem Mund

have one's eyes open — die Augen geöffnet haben

[not] be able to keep one's eyes open — [nicht mehr] die Augen offenhalten können; see also eye 1. 1)

2) (unconfined) offen [Gelände, Feuer]

on the open road — auf freier Strecke

in the open air — im Freien

3) (ready for business or use)

be open — [Laden, Museum, Bank usw.:] geöffnet sein

‘open’/‘open on Sundays’ — "geöffnet"/"Sonntags geöffnet"

4) (accessible) offen; öffentlich [Treffen, Rennen]; (available) frei [Stelle]; freibleibend [Angebot]

lay open — offen legen [Plan]

be open to the public — für die Öffentlichkeit zugänglich sein

the offer remains open until the end of the month — das Angebot bleibt bestehen od. gilt noch bis Ende des Monats

keep a position open for somebody — jemandem eine Stelle freihalten

5)

be open to — (exposed to) ausgesetzt sein (+ Dat.) [Wind, Sturm]; (receptive to) offen sein für [Ratschlag, andere Meinung, Vorschlag]

I hope to sell it for £1,000, but I am open to offers — ich möchte es für 1 000 Pfund verkaufen, aber ich lasse mit mir handeln

lay oneself [wide] open to criticism — etc. sich der Kritik usw. aussetzen

be open to question/doubt/argument — fraglich/zweifelhaft/umstritten sein

6) (undecided) offen

have an open mind about or on something — einer Sache gegenüber aufgeschlossen sein

with an open mind — aufgeschlossen

leave something open — etwas offen lassen

7) (undisguised, manifest) unverhohlen [Bewunderung, Hass]; offen [Verachtung, Empörung, Widerstand]; offensichtlich [Spaltung, Zwiespalt]

open war/warfare — offener Krieg/Kampf

8) (frank) offen [Wesen, Streit, Abstimmung, Gesicht]; (not secret) öffentlich [Wahl]

be open [about something/with somebody] — [in Bezug auf etwas (Akk.) /gegenüber jemandem] offen sein

9) (expanded, unfolded) offen, geöffnet [Pore, Regenschirm]; aufgeblüht [Blume, Knospe]; aufgeschlagen [Zeitung, Landkarte, Stadtplan]

somebody/something is an open book [to somebody] — (fig.) jemand/etwas ist ein aufgeschlagenes od. offenes Buch [für jemanden]
2. noun
in the open — (outdoors) unter freiem Himmel

[out] in the open — (fig.) [öffentlich] bekannt

come [out] into the open — (fig.) (become obvious) herauskommen (ugs.); (speak out) offen sprechen

bring something [out] into the open — (fig.) etwas an die Öffentlichkeit bringen
3. transitive verb
1) öffnen; aufmachen (ugs.)

open something with a key — etwas aufschließen

2) (allow access to)

open something [to somebody/something] — etwas öffnen [für jemanden/etwas]; (fig.) [jemandem/einer Sache] etwas öffnen

open something to the public — etwas der Öffentlichkeit (Dat.) zugänglich machen

3) (establish) eröffnen [Konferenz, Kampagne, Diskussion, Laden]; beginnen [Verhandlungen, Krieg, Spiel]; (declare open) eröffnen [Gebäude usw.]

open an account — ein Konto eröffnen

open fire [on somebody/something] — das Feuer [auf jemanden/etwas] eröffnen

4) (unfold, spread out) aufschlagen [Zeitung, Landkarte, Stadtplan, Buch]; aufspannen, öffnen [Schirm]; öffnen [Fallschirm, Poren]

open one's arms [wide] — die od. seine Arme [weit] ausbreiten

5) (reveal, expose)

something opens new horizons/a new world to somebody — (fig.) etwas eröffnet jemandem neue Horizonte/eine neue Welt

6) (make more receptive)

open one's heart or mind to somebody/something — sich jemandem/einer Sache öffnen

open somebody's mind to something — jemandem etwas nahe bringen
4. intransitive verb
1) sich öffnen; aufgehen; [Spalt, Kluft:] sich auftun

‘Doors open at 7 p.m.’ — "Einlass ab 19 Uhr"

open inwards/outwards — nach innen/außen aufgehen

the door would not open — die Tür ging nicht auf od. ließ sich nicht öffnen

his eyes opened wide — er riss die Augen weit auf

open into/on to something — zu etwas führen

the kitchen opens into the living room — die Küche hat eine Tür zum Wohnzimmer

2) (become open to customers) öffnen; aufmachen (ugs.); (start trading etc.) eröffnet werden

the shop does not open on Sundays — der Laden ist sonntags geschlossen

3) (make a start) beginnen; [Ausstellung:] eröffnet werden

Phrasal Verbs:

- open out

- open up
•• Cultural note:
Open University - OU

Eine britische Fernuniversität, die 1969 gegründet wurde und vor allem Berufstätigen im Fernstudium Kurse auf verschiedenem Niveau bietet, insbesondere wissenschaftliche und berufliche Fortbildungsprogramme. Studenten jeder Altersgruppe, selbst solche ohne die erforderlichen Schulabschlüsse, können das Studium nach vier oder fünf Jahren mit dem Bachelor's degree und dem Master's degree abschließen. Teilnehmer studieren von zu Hause - teilweise mittels audiovisueller Medien - schicken ihre Arbeit ein und erhalten eine Rückantwort von ihrem tutor (Dozent). Studenten können auch am Direktunterricht mit wöchentlichen Seminaren in Studienzentren und an Sommerschulen teilnehmen. Nach dem erfolgreichen Vorbild der Open University gibt es inzwischen auch in anderen Teilen der Welt ähnliche Fortbildungsprogramme

* * *

(not concealed) adj.

offen adj. (not hidden) adj.

nicht geheim adj. adj.

offen (Mathematik) adj.

offen adj.

übersichtlich (Gelände) adj. (close) the meeting expr.

Sitzung eröffnen (schließen) ausdr. (up) v.

erschließen (Markt) ausdr. v.

anfangen v.

eröffnen v.

öffnen v.

English-german dictionary > open
16 Creativity

   1) All Human Complex Problem Solving Is Creativity

   Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Models of Creative Association

   Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the inﬂuence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)

   3) Creative Innovation and Social Independence

   There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)

   4) Ego Strength and Emotional Stability among Creative Geniuses

   he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)

   5) Its Mundane Character

   he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)

   6) Mozart's Musical Ideas Came to Him in Polished Form

   From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)

   7) Scientific Theories and Works of Art Alike Originate in Fantasy

   Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)

   8) Self- Esteem and Creative Expression

   The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)

   9) Stages in Creative Problem- Solving

   In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)

    10) The Bisociative Pattern of the Creative Synthesis

   he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)

    11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with Disorder

   Even to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)

    12) The Inner Life of the Creative Process

   New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)

    13) The Problem of What Impels the Creative Person

   [P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....

   Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)

    14) Theories of Creative Thinking

   A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....

   Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity
17 STEP

step
1. noun
1) (one movement of the foot in walking, running, dancing etc: He took a step forward; walking with hurried steps.)

2) (the distance covered by this: He moved a step or two nearer; The restaurant is only a step (= a short distance) away.)

3) (the sound made by someone walking etc: I heard (foot) steps.)

4) (a particular movement with the feet, eg in dancing: The dance has some complicated steps.)

5) (a flat surface, or one flat surface in a series, eg on a stair or stepladder, on which to place the feet or foot in moving up or down: A flight of steps led down to the cellar; Mind the step!; She was sitting on the doorstep.)

6) (a stage in progress, development etc: Mankind made a big step forward with the invention of the wheel; His present job is a step up from his previous one.)

7) (an action or move (towards accomplishing an aim etc): That would be a foolish/sensible step to take; I shall take steps to prevent this happening again.)

2. verb
(to make a step, or to walk: He opened the door and stepped out; She stepped briskly along the road.)

- steps
- stepladder
- stepping-stones
- in
- out of step
- step aside
- step by step
- step in
- step out
- step up
- watch one's step

step¹ n

1. paso

I heard steps upstairs oí pasos en el piso de arriba

2. escalón / peldaño

mind the step cuidado con el escalón

we sat on the cathedral steps nos sentamos en las escaleras de la catedral

3. paso / medida

the first step is to open a bank account el primer paso es abrir una cuenta bancaria

step by step paso a paso

step² vb

1. dar un paso / andar

step this way, please pase por aquí, por favor

he stepped out of the car bajó del coche

2. pisar

he stepped on a banana skin pisó una piel de plátano

El pasado y participio pasado de step se escribe stepped; el gerundio se escribe stepping

step

tr[step]

noun

1 (gen) paso; (sound) paso, pisada

■ he walks with quick steps anda con paso rápido

■ she took a step forward dio un paso adelante

■ I heard steps outside oí pasos fuera

■ I retraced my steps volví sobre mis pasos

■ we're learning a new step at dancing classes estamos aprendiendo un nuevo paso en las clases de baile

2 (distance) paso

■ it's quite a step to the swimming pool hay una buena caminata hasta la piscina

■ it's only a step to the library from my house la biblioteca está a un paso de mi casa

3 (move, act) paso

■ what's the next step? ¿cuál es el próximo paso?

■ a step in the right direction un paso hacia adelante

■ the first step on the road to victory el primer paso hacia la victoria

■ a major step forward for mankind un paso gigantesco para la humanidad

4 (measure) medida; (formality) gestión nombre femenino, trámite nombre masculino

■ we've taken all the necessary steps hemos tomado todas las medidas necesarias

5 (degree on scale, stage in process) peldaño, escalón nombre masculino, paso

■ she's gone up another step on the career ladder ha ascendido otro peldaño en la escala profesional

6 (stair) escalón nombre masculino, peldaño, grada; (of ladder) escalón nombre masculino, travesaño; (of vehicle) estribo

■ mind the step cuidado con el escalón

intransitive verb

1 (move, walk) dar un paso, andar

■ step this way pase por aquí

■ he stepped into the house entró en la casa

■ she stepped off the plane se bajó del avión

2 (tread) pisar

■ he stepped in a puddle pisó un charco

■ you stepped on my foot me pisaste

plural noun steps

1 SMALLBRITISH ENGLISH/SMALL (stepladder) escalera de tijera

1 (outdoor) escalinata; (indoor) escalera; (of plane) escalerilla

■ a flight of steps un tramo de escalera

\

SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALL

every step of the way en todo momento, desde principio a fin

step by step paso a paso, poco a poco

step on it!, step on the gas! ¡date prisa!, ¡pisa a fondo!

to be in step / keep in step (walking) llevar el paso 2 (dancing) llevar el compás

to be one step ahead llevar la ventaja

to be out of step (walking) no llevar el paso 2 (dancing) no llevar el compás

to step into somebody's shoes pasar a ocupar el puesto de alguien

to step into the breach llenar el hueco

to watch one's step (be careful) andar con cuidado 2 (when walking) mirar por dónde camina

a step up un ascenso

step ['stɛp] vi, stepped ; stepping

1) : dar un paso

step this way, please: pase por aquí, por favor

he stepped outside: salió

2)

to step on : pisar

step n

1) : paso m

step by step: paso por paso

2) stair: escalón m, peldaño m

3) rung: escalón m, travesaño m

4) measure, move: medida f, paso m

to take steps: tomar medidas

5) stride: paso m

with a quick step: con paso rápido

step

n.

• escalera s.f.

• escalón s.m.

• estribo s.m.

• estribo de un coche s.m.

• etapa s.f.

• gestión s.f.

• grada s.f.

• grado s.m.

• medida s.f.

• paso s.m.

• patada s.f.

• peldaño s.m.

• trámite s.m.

v.

• andar v.

(§pret: anduv-)

• escalonar v.

• medir a pasos v.

• pisar v.

I step
noun

1) c (footstep, pace) paso m

to take a step forward — dar* un paso adelante

to follow in somebody's steps — seguir* los pasos de alguien

to be/keep one step ahead: they're one step ahead of us nos llevan cierta ventaja; he tries to keep one step ahead of his students trata de que sus alumnos no lo aventajen; to watch one's step (be cautious, behave well) andarse* con cuidado or con pie de plomo; watch your step — ( when walking) mira por dónde caminas

2)

a) c ( of dance) paso m

b) u (in marching, walking) paso m

to be in/out of step — llevar/no llevar el paso; ( in dancing) llevar/no llevar el compás or el ritmo

to break step — romper* el paso

in/out of step with somebody/something: the leaders are out of step with the wishes of the majority — los líderes no sintonizan con los deseos de la mayoría

3) ( distance) (no pl)

it's only a step away — está a un paso

it's a fair step from here to the station — hay un buen trecho hasta la estación

4) c ( move) paso m; ( measure) medida f

a step in the right direction — un paso hacia adelante

to take steps (to + inf) — tomar medidas (para + inf)

5)

a) c ( on stair) escalón m, peldaño m; ( on ladder) travesaño m, escalón m

mind the step — cuidado con el escalón

the museum steps — la escalinata or las escaleras del museo

a flight of steps — un tramo m de escalera

b) steps pl ( stepladder) (BrE) escalera f ( de mano or de tijera)

6) c

a) ( degree in scale) peldaño m, escalón m

that would be a step up in her career — eso significaría un ascenso para ella

b) (AmE Mus)

whole step — tono m

half step — semitono m

II

intransitive verb - pp-

would you step inside/outside for a moment? — ¿quiere pasar/salir un momento?

to step off a plane — bajarse de un avión

she stepped over the threshold — atravesó el umbral

to step IN/ON something — pisar algo

sorry, I stepped on your toe — perdón, te pisé

to step on it o on the gas — (colloq) darse* prisa, apurarse (AmL), meterle (AmL fam)

Phrasal Verbs:

- step aside

- step back

- step down

- step forward

- step in

- step out

- step up

[step]
N ABBR = Science and Technology for Environmental Protection
* * *

I [step]
noun

1) c (footstep, pace) paso m

to take a step forward — dar* un paso adelante

to follow in somebody's steps — seguir* los pasos de alguien

to be/keep one step ahead: they're one step ahead of us nos llevan cierta ventaja; he tries to keep one step ahead of his students trata de que sus alumnos no lo aventajen; to watch one's step (be cautious, behave well) andarse* con cuidado or con pie de plomo; watch your step — ( when walking) mira por dónde caminas

2)

a) c ( of dance) paso m

b) u (in marching, walking) paso m

to be in/out of step — llevar/no llevar el paso; ( in dancing) llevar/no llevar el compás or el ritmo

to break step — romper* el paso

in/out of step with somebody/something: the leaders are out of step with the wishes of the majority — los líderes no sintonizan con los deseos de la mayoría

3) ( distance) (no pl)

it's only a step away — está a un paso

it's a fair step from here to the station — hay un buen trecho hasta la estación

4) c ( move) paso m; ( measure) medida f

a step in the right direction — un paso hacia adelante

to take steps (to + inf) — tomar medidas (para + inf)

5)

a) c ( on stair) escalón m, peldaño m; ( on ladder) travesaño m, escalón m

mind the step — cuidado con el escalón

the museum steps — la escalinata or las escaleras del museo

a flight of steps — un tramo m de escalera

b) steps pl ( stepladder) (BrE) escalera f ( de mano or de tijera)

6) c

a) ( degree in scale) peldaño m, escalón m

that would be a step up in her career — eso significaría un ascenso para ella

b) (AmE Mus)

whole step — tono m

half step — semitono m

II

intransitive verb - pp-

would you step inside/outside for a moment? — ¿quiere pasar/salir un momento?

to step off a plane — bajarse de un avión

she stepped over the threshold — atravesó el umbral

to step IN/ON something — pisar algo

sorry, I stepped on your toe — perdón, te pisé

to step on it o on the gas — (colloq) darse* prisa, apurarse (AmL), meterle (AmL fam)

Phrasal Verbs:

- step aside

- step back

- step down

- step forward

- step in

- step out

- step up

English-spanish dictionary > STEP
18 faculty

noun

1) (physical capability) Fähigkeit, die; Vermögen, das

faculty of sight/speech/hearing/thought — Seh-/Sprach-/Hör-/Denkvermögen, das

2) (mental power)

in [full] possession of [all] one's [mental] faculties — im [Voll]besitz [all] seiner [geistigen] Kräfte

3) (Univ.): (department) Fakultät, die; Fachbereich, der

4) (Amer. Sch., Univ.): (staff) Lehrkörper, der

* * *
['fækəlti]
plural - faculties; noun

1) (a power of the mind: the faculty of reason.) die Gabe

2) (a natural power of the body: the faculty of hearing.) die Fähigkeit

3) (ability or skill: She has a faculty for saying the right thing.) die Fähigkeit

4) ((often with capital) a section of a university: the Faculty of Arts/Science.) die Fakultät

* * *

fa·cul·ty

[ˈfæk^əlti, AM -t̬i]

n

1. (university department) Fakultät f, Fachbereich m

the F\faculty of Arts/Law/Science die philosophische/juristische/naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät

2. no pl AM SCH Lehrkörper m, Lehrerkollegium nt; UNIV [Lehrkörper m einer] Fakultät; (all professors at university) Professorenkollegium nt

business/law \faculty Lehrpersonal nt im Fachbereich Betriebswirtschaftslehre/Rechtswissenschaften

the lower/upper school \faculty die Lehrer pl der Sekundarstufe I/II

3. (natural ability) Fähigkeit f, Vermögen nt kein pl

to be in command [or possession] of all one's mental faculties im Vollbesitz seiner geistigen Kräfte sein

to have [all] one's faculties im [Voll]besitz seiner [geistigen] Kräfte sein

4. (skill) Talent nt, Begabung f ( for für + akk)

5. LAW Dispens m

* * *
['fkəltI]
n

1) (= power of mind) Vermögen nt, Fähigkeit f, Kraft f; (= ability, aptitude) Begabung f, Talent nt

mental faculties — geistige Fähigkeiten pl, Geisteskräfte pl

faculty of reason — Vernunft f

faculty of hearing/sight — Hör-/Sehvermögen nt

to be in ( full) possession of (all) one's faculties — im Vollbesitz seiner Kräfte sein

to have a faculty for doing sth — ein Talent dafür haben, etw zu tun

2) (UNIV) Fakultät f

the medical faculty, the faculty of medicine — die medizinische Fakultät

3) (ECCL) Vollmacht f

* * *

faculty [ˈfækltı] s

1. Fähigkeit f, Vermögen n:

faculty of hearing Hörvermögen

2. Kraft f, Geschicklichkeit f, Gewandtheit f

3. (natürliche) Gabe, Anlage f, Talent n, Fähigkeit f:

(mental) faculties Geisteskräfte;

be in full possession of all one’s faculties im Vollbesitz seiner geistigen Kräfte sein;

have a faculty for ( oder of) doing sth das Talent oder die Fähigkeit haben, etwas zu tun

4. UNIV

a) Fakultät f, Wissenszweig m:

the medical faculty die medizinische Fakultät, weitS. die Mediziner pl

b)(Mitglieder pl einer) Fakultät, Lehrkörper m

c) besonders US Lehr-, Verwaltungspersonal n (auch einer Schule)

5. JUR

a) Ermächtigung f, Befugnis f ( for zu, für)

b) meist pl Vermögen n, Eigentum n

6. REL Befugnis f, Dispens m/f

* * *

noun

1) (physical capability) Fähigkeit, die; Vermögen, das

faculty of sight/speech/hearing/thought — Seh-/Sprach-/Hör-/Denkvermögen, das

2) (mental power)

in [full] possession of [all] one's [mental] faculties — im [Voll]besitz [all] seiner [geistigen] Kräfte

3) (Univ.): (department) Fakultät, die; Fachbereich, der

4) (Amer. Sch., Univ.): (staff) Lehrkörper, der

* * *

(University) n.

Institut -e n. n.

Fachbereich m.

Fakultät -en f.

Fähigkeit f.

Lehrkörper m.

English-german dictionary > faculty
19 faculty

['fækəlti]
plural - faculties; noun

1) (a power of the mind: the faculty of reason.) evne; anlæg

2) (a natural power of the body: the faculty of hearing.) evne; sans

3) (ability or skill: She has a faculty for saying the right thing.) evne; sans

4) ((often with capital) a section of a university: the Faculty of Arts/Science.) fakultet

* * *
['fækəlti]
plural - faculties; noun

1) (a power of the mind: the faculty of reason.) evne; anlæg

2) (a natural power of the body: the faculty of hearing.) evne; sans

3) (ability or skill: She has a faculty for saying the right thing.) evne; sans

4) ((often with capital) a section of a university: the Faculty of Arts/Science.) fakultet

English-Danish dictionary > faculty
20 psychology

noun

(the study or science of the human mind.) psykologi

- psychological
- psychologically
- psychologist
* * *

noun

(the study or science of the human mind.) psykologi

- psychological
- psychologically
- psychologist

English-Danish dictionary > psychology

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